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Abstract
REBECCA M. GLAWTSCHEW: Essays on Statistical Discrimination in a
Dynamic Framework.
(Under the direction of Peter Norman.)
This dissertation consists of two papers in the field of statistical discrimination. In the first
paper, I determine the potential causes of persistent labor market inequality by developing
a dynamic model of statistical discrimination in a competitive environment. In this dynamic
model, the forward-looking behavior of economic agents determines the dynamic paths to
the steady states. By characterizing these dynamic paths, I am able to establish the initial
conditions that can lead to each steady state and to determine if it is possible to move from
one steady state to another. I find that the model can be broken down into two classes of
parameterizations. In the first class, history alone determines the final outcome. In the second
class, the expectations of forward-looking may agents determine the final outcome. In both of
these cases, moving from one steady state to another is not possible. Using a simplified version
of the dynamic model, I also examine how the parameter values impact both the existence of
multiple steady states and the importance of expectations in determining the final outcome.
In the second paper, I consider the effectiveness of three government policies designed to
eliminate persistent statistical discrimination in the framework of the dynamic model developed
in the first paper. I determine the paths that workers will take after a policy is instated as
well as how long a policy needs to be in place to guarantee the successful elimination of
discrimination. The policies I consider are (1) a hiring subsidy that promotes the hiring of
disadvantaged workers to the better job, (2) an investment voucher that defrays the monetary
cost of human capital investment, and (3) an equal treatment policy under which firms are
required to treat workers equally across groups. I find that all three policies have the potential
to eliminate persistent discrimination if certain conditions are met.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This document presents the two papers that form my dissertation in accordance with the
Graduate School and Economics Department at UNC Chapel Hill.
The first paper is titled “Persistent statistical discrimination in a competitive economy”,
wherein I develop a dynamic model of statistical discrimination that allows me to answer several
questions that are not addressed in the static literature. While static models of statistical
discrimination successfully explain why workers from different observable groups may earn
different wages on average, these results are only examined in equilibrium. Static models
cannot explain how the groups get to their respective equilibria nor are they able to address
whether it is possible for a group to move from their current equilibrium to another. In order
to answer these important questions, I develop a dynamic model based on the static models
of Coate and Loury (1993) and Moro and Norman (2003). In particular, I introduce dynamics
to the model by allowing workers to be long-lived. With this addition, I determine both the
dynamic paths that can be taken to the relevant steady states and the conditions under which
discrimination in this model will be persistent.
I find that there are two potential forms that the dynamic paths can take depending on
the parameter values. In one class of parameterizations, history alone determines the final
outcome. This situation is more likely to occur if workers heavily discount future wages. In
the second class of parameterizations, the dynamic paths create what I refer to as the uncertain
region. If a group’s initial conditions place them in this region, then the expectations of the
forward-looking workers will determine the final outcome. This type of dynamic path will
occur if the workers place significant value on future wages. I also establish that, no matter
what form the dynamic paths take, moving from one steady state to another is not possible.
The second paper is titled “Eliminating persistent discrimination: an analysis of several
policy options”. In this paper I revisit the model of the first paper and make a few additional
assumptions. Using this dynamic framework, I analyze the effectiveness of three government
policies designed to eliminate existing discrimination. The policies that I investigate are (1)
a hiring subsidy that promotes the hiring of disadvantaged workers to the better job, (2) an
investment voucher that defrays the monetary cost of human capital investment, and (3) an
equal treatment policy under which firms are required to treat workers equally across groups.
By examining these policies in a dynamic framework, I am able to determine the dynamic path
that the workers will take once a policy is put in place and the point at which it is safe for the
government to remove the policy and still guarantee the eventual elimination of discrimination.
With the inclusion of competitive wages, I am also able to complete meaningful analysis of the
welfare effects of the three policies.
The analysis indicates that the hiring subsidy policy will always effectively eliminate dis-
crimination if a large enough subsidy is offered. However, while the policy is in place the
advantaged group experiences a significant loss in welfare. On the other hand, the investment
voucher policy results in very little loss in welfare to the advantaged group, but it can only
be successfully applied if a large enough proportion of the cost of investment is monetary in
nature. The equal treatment policy is attractive as it requires no transfers from the advan-
taged to the disadvantaged workers and welfare losses are relatively small when it is successful.
However, there are many situations in which the equal treatment policy will not be successful,
for example, if there are relatively more disadvantaged workers than advantaged workers in
the population.
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Chapter 2
Persistent statistical discrimination in a competitive economy
2.1 Introduction
This paper develops a dynamic model of statistical discrimination that can rationalize per-
sistent labor market inequality across observable groups as a result of either differing initial
firm beliefs or differing group expectations. Just as in related static settings, discrimination
in this model is a result of different groups coordinating on different steady states. However,
with the addition of dynamics I am able to determine how the different groups get to their
respective steady states as well as the conditions under which they become stuck in that steady
state. Understanding the dynamic system also allows for richer analysis of government policies
designed to mitigate labor market inequality.
With the introduction of long-lived workers, I am able to add dynamics to a special case
of the Moro and Norman (2003) model of statistical discrimination. Statistical discrimination
refers to the situation in which a decision-maker uses observable characteristics of individuals
as a proxy for unobservable, but outcome relevant, characteristics. In this model, the human
capital investment decisions of workers are unobservable, as a result firms will condition wages
and job assignments on group identity. Consequently, workers from different groups, that are
otherwise identical, may be assigned to different jobs and be paid different wages in equilibrium.
Multiple steady states are necessary for the statistical discrimination in this model to be
persistent, otherwise, the groups are treated identically as soon as they both reach the single
steady state. I focus on the case in which there are three steady states. Under this assumption,
the middle steady state is unstable and the dynamic paths to the high and low steady states
emanate from that point. These paths can take several forms depending on the parameter
values.
For one class of parameterizations, initial firm beliefs about the average skill level of a
group are decisive and a group’s expectations about future payoffs are irrelevant. In this case,
a group will converge to the low steady state with certainty if initial firm beliefs are below those
of the middle steady state. Conversely, if firm beliefs are above those of the middle steady
state the group will converge to the high steady state. In this situation it is not possible for a
group to move from one steady state to another.
In another class of parameterizations, the dynamic paths create what I refer to as the
uncertain region of firm beliefs. If initial firm beliefs about a group fall into this region, then
it is possible for that group to converge to either the high or the low steady state. The final
outcome depends on the group’s expectations about future payoffs. If the group is optimistic
about the future, they will converge to the high steady state. If they are pessimistic, they will
find themselves on the path to the low steady state. In this class of parameterizations groups
are not able to move from one steady state to another.
By characterizing the dynamic paths to the steady states, I am able to establish the initial
conditions that can lead to discrimination. I find that discrimination will arise if initial firm
beliefs about one group are relatively high and for the other group they are relatively low, or if
one group is optimistic about future payoffs while the other group is pessimistic. Furthermore,
the fact that groups may become stuck in a steady state implies that re-coordination on a
different steady state is not possible without a structural change in the model. Consequently,
if present, discrimination will be persistent. These are important results that related static
models have been unable to address.
I also consider a simple version of the dynamic model and examine two parametric exam-
ples: one in which historical firms beliefs are decisive and one in which the expectations of
workers potentially determine the final outcome. In the framework of this simple model, I find
that multiple steady states are more likely when signals about the quality of workers are of
intermediate precision. I also find that expectations are less likely to determine a group’s final
outcome if the rate of population turnover is high or if the population discounts future payoffs
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at a high rate.
The paper is structured as follows. The related literature is discussed in the remainder of
Section 2.1. The static model is introduced in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 develops the dynamic
model and addresses the conditions under which discrimination will be persistent. In Section
2.4 a simple version of the dynamic model is described and two parametric examples are
examined. I provide a brief rationalization for the existence of two paths in Section 2.5.
Finally, Section 2.6 concludes.
Related Literature
There is a large literature on statistical discrimination that builds upon the seminal contribu-
tions by Arrow (1973) and Phelps (1972). In models of statistical discrimination, uncertainty
in the labor market makes it rational for firms to condition on group identity. In particular,
firms in these models are unable to perfectly observe worker productivity so they base hiring
and wage decisions on a noisy signal and on prior beliefs about the productivity of workers
from different groups. In such environments inequality can occur as the result of exogenous
group differences in the precision of information1 or as a result of multiple equilibria2. The
model presented here is the latter type.
The model developed in this paper is highly related to both Coate and Loury (1993) and
Moro and Norman (2003). Coate and Loury (1993) present a static model of statistical dis-
crimination where two ex ante groups may end up in different, Pareto ranked, equilibria. Their
model formalizes many of ideas that were originally presented loosely in Arrow (1973), but it
makes the additional assumption that wages are set exogenously. They find that inequality
will occur if the two groups of workers play different equilibria.
Moro and Norman (2003) relax two of the assumptions in Coate and Loury’s static model.
In particular, they remove the linearity of the production technology and the exogeneity of
wages. Allowing for curvature in the production function eliminates the separability of groups,
1As in Phelps (1972), Aigner and Glen (1977), Cornell and Welch (1996), Lundberg and Startz (1983) and
Oettinger (1996).
2See Arrow (1973), Spence (1974), Akerlof (1976), Coate and Loury (1993)and Moro and Norman (2003).
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thus, creating the possibility for true interaction effects between groups. Introducing endoge-
nous wages allows for more meaningful welfare analysis. Under these relaxed assumptions,
they determine that the dominant group will actually gain from discrimination and, as a re-
sult, they will be motivated to ensure its continuation. In the model presented in this paper, I
incorporate endogenous wages, however, for simplicity I assume that the production technology
is linear.
There is relatively little literature that addresses discrimination in a dynamic environment.
Fryer (2007), Blume (2006) and Kim and Loury (2009) all develop dynamic models that are
adaptations of the original Coate and Loury (1993) paper. Fryer adds dynamics by introducing
a promotion stage after workers are initially hired. In this environment he finds that a firm
may discriminate against a group in the initial hiring process and then prefer to promote
members of that group once they are hired. This idea of “belief flipping” originates from the
fact that those workers in the disadvantaged group who are available to promote were initially
held to a higher standard. Consequently, during the promotion stage firms believe they are
more likely to be skilled than workers in the advantaged group.
Blume (2006) takes a different approach and investigates the effects of two exogenously
specified learning dynamics that are applied to the static Coate and Loury (1993) model. He
characterizes long-run stable patterns of discrimination under both learning dynamics and is
able to connect them to the equilibria of the static model.
Kim and Loury (2009) add long-lived workers to the Coate and Loury (1993) static model
in order to introduce dynamics. They determine that the equilibria of this dynamic model are
characterized by a two variable dynamic system. Using the dynamic system, they describe
the paths to the relevant steady states. Their analysis has similarities to the model presented
here; however, they do not incorporate a competitive environment and their main focus is on
the analysis of a highly simplified model.
Antonovics (2006) considers a dynamic model of statistical discrimination that accounts for
intergenerational income mobility. Like the model I present, the focus of Antonovics’ analysis
is to show how a group can become trapped in a bad equilibrium. However, she achieves this
result by allowing for income to be transmitted across generations through parental investments
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in the human capital of children.
While not related in subject matter, Krugman (1991) is related in its approach to analyzing
dynamic models with multiple steady states. In this paper, he determines that the existence of
two equilibrium paths leading to the two steady states has the potential to create an “overlap”.
Within this overlap, expectations determine the final steady state, and outside of it, the final
steady state is determined by history alone. This interpretation is central to my analysis of
persistent discrimination in Section 2.3.
2.2 The static model
In this section, I present the static model that is the foundation of the dynamic analysis in
Section 2.3. This static model is adapted from Moro and Norman (2003); I generate compet-
itive wages just as they do. Given that my primary goal is to focus on the dynamic paths to
the steady states, I use a simple linear production function so that groups remain separable
as in Coate and Loury (1993). A thorough analysis of this model allows me to highlight the
questions that are left unanswered in the static environment and to draw comparisons across
the equilibria of the static model and the steady states of the dynamic model.
2.2.1 The economic environment
The firms
Consider a market where two firms compete for workers. Output is generated by the completion
of two types of tasks, a simple task and a complex task. All workers are able to perform the
simple task, while only those workers that invest in becoming qualified are able to successfully
perform the complex task. Consequently, the effective input of labor into the simple task is
the total number of workers a firm employs in that task. I represent this with S. The effective
input of labor into the complex task is the number of qualified workers a firm employs in that
task. I represent this with C. Both firms’ output is linear in the two tasks; it is given by
Y (S,C) = αsS + αcC, where αc > αs > 0.
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The workers
There is a continuum of workers with mass normalized to unity. Each worker belongs to one
of two identifiable groups, B(lack) or W(hite). The proportion of workers that are members
of the B group is λB and the proportion of workers that are members of the W group is λW .
All workers have the option to invest in human capital prior to entering the labor market.
If a worker chooses to invest in human capital, he becomes qualified and is therefore able to
complete the complex task. Workers who do not make this investment are unqualified and can
only successfully complete the simple task. In order to invest in human capital a worker must
pay a cost, c. This cost varies across workers and is distributed over [c, c] ⊆ < according to a
continuous and strictly increasing distribution G(c).
Workers are risk neutral and care only about the net wages that they receive. This means
that a worker has no preference over the two tasks outside of the different wages they provide.
Pay-offs are additively separable in income and cost of investment. That is, a worker with a
cost c who chooses to become qualified and earns a wage ωq will receive utility of ωq − c, and
a worker who is unqualified and earns a wage ωu will receive utility of ωu.
Information technology
Firms are unable observe whether an individual worker invested in human capital, instead for
each worker they observe a signal θ ∈ [0, 1]. This signal is distributed according to density fq
if the worker is qualified and fu otherwise. Both densities are bounded away from zero and,
without further loss of generality, fq(θ)/fu(θ) is increasing the θ. Using Bayes’ rule, the firms
form beliefs about the likelihood that a worker is qualified given his signal. If piJ represents
a firm’s prior belief about whether a worker from group J is qualified, then the posterior
probability that a worker from group J with signal θ is qualified is
p(θ, piJ) ≡ pi
Jfq(θ)
piJfq(θ) + (1− piJ)fu(θ) . (2.1)
The monotone likelihood ratio property implies that p(θ, piJ) is increasing in θ so that a
high signal reflects positively on a worker and a low signal negatively. I denote the associated
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cumulative distributions by Fq and Fu. I assume that a law of large numbers holds so that these
are also the realized frequency distributions of signals for qualified and unqualified workers,
respectively.
2.2.2 The game
The timing of the game is as follows: In the first stage of the game firms post wage and
task assignment rules and workers simultaneously decide whether or not to invest in becoming
qualified. An investment strategy for a worker in group J is a map vJ : [c, c] → [0, 1]. Put
simply, a strategy maps cost of investment into the probability of investment.
Firms may condition wage and task assignments on θ. A strategy for a firm i is to select
some wage schedule ωJi : [0, 1] → <+ and a task assignment rule τJi : [0, 1] → [0, 1] for each
group J . This task assignment rule maps worker signals into the probability of assigning a
worker to the complex task.
In the second stage nature assigns a signal θ to each worker. The signal for a qualified
worker is distributed according to density fq and for an unqualified worker it is distributed
according to density fu. In the third and final stage workers observe the posted wage and task
assignment rules and decide where to work.
Workers care only about potential wages when comparing job offers and their investment
costs are sunk. So they will choose to work for the firm whose wage and task assignment rule
provides them with the highest wages.
2.2.3 Equilibria
I consider Nash equilibria satisfying the additional requirement that workers choose firms in a
sequentially rational way after any history of play. These equilibria are perfect Bayesian. There
are two main components to the equilibria of this game: First, each firm must employ both an
optimal task assignment rule and an equilibrium wage assignment rule. Second, the workers
must make their investment decisions optimally; they should invest only if their expected
benefit exceeds their cost. The equilibria are determined by taking into account the optimal
wages and task assignments and ensuring that the actual investment rate is equal to the firms’
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beliefs. Discrimination in this model is possible as long as there are multiple equilibria.
Equilibrium task assignments and wages
The group specific fraction of qualified workers is denoted by pi = (piB, piW ). In equilibrium the
firms’ beliefs about the group specific fraction of qualified workers will equal the true fraction
so I use pi to represent both of these values. I also refer to this value as the investment rate of
a group.
Since (2.1) is increasing in signal, it is without loss of generality to focus on task assignment
rules with a threshold property. Under this type of rule, workers with a signal above the
threshold are assigned to the complex task and workers with lower signals are assigned to
the simple task. Given a threshold θ¯J for group J , the effective input of labor into the
complex task is C = piJ(1 − Fq(θ¯J)) and the effective input of labor into the simple task is
S = piJFq(θ¯
J) + (1− piJ)Fu(θ¯J). Each firm will maximize its output with a threshold solving:
∑
J=B,W
λJ max
θJ∈[0,1]
(
αc
[
piJ
(
1− Fq(θJ)
) ]
+ αs
[
piJFq(θ
J) + (1− piJ)Fu(θJ)
])
. (2.2)
This task assignment problem can be solved separately for each group because the firms face
a linear production function.
The fact that production is linear in C and S creates the potential for θˆ(piJ) to be a
correspondence. In order to eliminate this issue and ensure that there is a unique solution to
(2.2), I make an additional assumption on fq(θ)/fu(θ).
Lemma 1. Suppose that fq(θ)/fu(θ) is strictly increasing in θ. Then for each group J there
is a unique θˆ(piJ) ∈ [0, 1] that solves (2.2) for any piJ >> 0.
Proof. Let θˆ(piJ) be any solution to (2.2). The effective factor inputs into the complex and
simple task are
CJ(piJ) ≡piJ [1− Fq(θˆ(piJ))] and
SJ(piJ) ≡piJFq(θˆ(piJ)) + (1− piJ)Fu(θˆ(piJ)) for J = B,W, (2.3)
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respectively. Combining the equations of (2.3) yields
SJ = pi − CJ + (1− pi)Fu
(
F−1q
(
pi − C
pi
))
, (2.4)
which is the maximal level of SJ given CJ . Using (2.4) I can restate the task assignment
problem in (2.2) as
max
(CJ ,SJ )
[αc(λ
BCB + λWCW ) + αs(λ
BSB + λWSW )]
s.t. SJ ≤ piJ − CJ + (1− piJ)Fu
(
F−1q
(
piJ − CJ
piJ
))
for J = B,W. (2.5)
The monotone likelihood ratio implies that the right hand side of the constraint is a concave
function of CJ and strictly concave under the strict monotone likelihood assumption. Problem
(2.5) is a matter of maximizing a linear function, that is increasing in both arguments, subject
to a strictly concave constraint. This yields a unique solution.
From here on I assume that fq(θ)/fu(θ) is strictly increasing in θ so that Lemma 1 applies
and θˆ(piJ) is guaranteed to be unique. The optimal threshold for group J is
θˆ(piJ) =

1 if αcp(1, pi
J) ≤ αs
0 if αcp(0, pi
J) ≥ αs,
the unique solution to
αcp(θ, pi
J) = αs if αcp(0, pi
J) < αs < αcp(1, pi
J).
(2.6)
This optimal threshold can be interpreted in the following way: All workers will be assigned
to the simple task (a threshold of 1) if prior beliefs are such that even a worker with a signal
of 1 has higher expected productivity in the simple task. All workers will be assigned to the
complex task (a threshold of 0) if prior beliefs are such that even a worker with a signal of 0
has higher expected productivity in the complex task. In all other cases, the optimal threshold
is the θ at which a worker’s expected productivity in the complex task is equivalent to that
of the simple task. Note that θˆ(piJ) is a non-increasing function of piJ and that θˆ(0) ≤ 1 and
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θˆ(1) = 0.
Following Moro and Norman (2003) I call a strategy profile a continuation equilibrium if
all equilibrium conditions except the requirement that investments are best responses to wages
are satisfied. The following result states that wages are given by expected marginal products
and task assignments are constrained efficient in any continuation equilibrium.
Proposition 1. Suppose that a fraction piJ of workers in group J invest so that θˆ(piJ) is the
unique solution to (2). Then there exists a continuation equilibrium where both firms offer the
following wages:
ωJ(θ, piJ) =
 αs if θ < θˆ(pi
J)
αcp(θ, pi
J) if θ ≥ θˆ(piJ),
(2.7)
and assign a worker with characteristics (J, θ) to the complex task if and only if θ ≥ θˆ(piJ),
where θˆ(piJ) is as in (2.6). Moreover, in any continuation equilibrium where a fraction piJ of
the workers invest the wage schedule posted by firm i for group J , wJi (θ), agrees with (2.7) for
almost all θ ∈ [0, 1] for each firm i.
Proof. See Appendix A
Equilibrium investment decision
In equilibrium the optimal behavior for a worker is to invest in human capital if and only if
the gain in expected earnings is higher than the cost. I refer to this gain in expected earnings
as the gain from investment. Given that a proportion piJ of the J population invests and that
wages are consistent with the continuation equilibrium in (2.7), the gain from investment for
a worker in group J is
γ(piJ , θˆ(piJ)) =
∫ 1
0
ω(θ, piJ)fq(θ)dθ −
∫ 1
0
ω(θ, piJ)fu(θ)dθ
= αs[Fq(θˆ(pi
J))− Fu(θˆ(piJ))] + αc
∫ 1
θˆ(piJ )
p(θ, piJ)[fq(θ)− fu(θ)]dθ. (2.8)
The gain from investment depends on pi in two ways, through p(θ, pi), as a result of the optimal
wage structure, and through the optimal task assignment rule θˆ(pi). For expositional simplicity
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I refer to the gain from investment as γ(piJ) from now on.
It is useful to briefly discuss the potential values of the gain from investment function.
From (2.6) I can show that there exists a pi > 0 such that all workers are assigned to the
simple task when piJ ≤ pi. There is also some p¯i < 1 such that all workers are assigned to the
complex task if piJ ≥ p¯i. I can also show that when piJ ≤ pi, then γ(piJt ) = 0. However, the
gain from investment is strictly positive in the range (pi, 1) because p(θt, pi
J) is increasing in
signal. Thus, there is wage inequality even when all workers are assigned to the complex task.
Given the cost structure, the proportion of workers in group J that benefit from investing is
G(γ(piJ)). In a Nash equilibrium, firms have rational beliefs about the proportion of qualified
workers and workers’ investment decisions are rational given the optimal wage structure. These
equilibrium conditions imply that any equilibrium is fully characterized by all pairs of beliefs
(piB, piW ) satisfying
piJ = G(γ(piJ)) for J = B,W. (2.9)
In any equilibrium the proportion of each group that is qualified is a solution to (2.9) and from
any solution to (2.9) I can construct wage schedules, task assignments and investment decisions
consistent with the equilibrium. The existence of at least one equilibrium is immediate since
γ(piJ) is composed of continuous functions.
If there is only one solution to (2.9), then there is a unique equilibrium where groups must
be treated identically. More interesting is the case where there are multiple solutions to (2.9),
and thus the possibility of discrimination.
Existence of multiple equilibria
Figure 2.1 demonstrates a case where there are three equilibria. The hump-shaped curve is the
graph {(γ, pi)|γ = γ(pi)}; it represents the expected gain from investment given an investment
rate of pi. The shape of this graph comes from the previous discussion of how the value of the
gain from investment changes with pi. The s-shaped curve is the graph {(γ, pi)|pi = G(γ)}; it
indicates the proportion of workers who will invest given a gain from investment of γ. The
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Figure 2.1: Three equilibria in the static model
shape of this graph comes from the assumption that G(·) is continuous and strictly increasing.
The existence of multiple solutions is not always guaranteed and depends on the shape of
γ and G(·). The possibility of multiple solutions can be proven by construction: If I fix the
parameters fu, fq, αc and αs, then I can find an appropriate G(·) function such that (2.9)
has multiple solutions. Graphically, if I fix the hump shaped curve in Figure 2.1, I can ensure
multiple equilibria simply by selecting a G(·) function that yields multiple intersections of the
two graphs. More generally, for any fu and fq that satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio and
any technology parameters, I can find a non-trivial set of G(·) functions that ensure multiple
equilibria.
Multiple equilibria are more likely to occur when signals about investment decisions are of
intermediate precision. On the other hand, if these signals are very noisy, then they provide
the firms with little additional information. In this case the benefit to becoming qualified is
negligible and one equilibrium at a relatively low investment rate is likely to occur. If signals
are not noisy enough, then firms can easily distinguish between workers that are qualified
and workers that are not. This makes investment very attractive, and one equilibrium at a
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relatively high investment rate is the likely outcome. I investigate this idea further in Section
2.4 where I develop a simple version of the model and directly examine the impact of signal
precision on the existence of multiple equilibria.
When there are multiple solutions to (2.9) it is easy to show that they are Pareto rankable.
Proposition 2. Let pi∗ be the largest solution to (2.9). Then (piB, piW ) = (pi∗, pi∗) Pareto
dominates all other equilibria of the model.
Proof. See proof of Proposition 4.
In this static model discrimination is sustained only as a result of coordination failure and
the existence of multiple steady states is explained by self-confirming prior beliefs. When
workers from one group are believed less likely to be qualified, this belief will be self-confirmed
at the lower steady state. Similarly, when workers from one group are believed more likely to
be qualified, this belief will be self-confirmed at the higher steady state. However, this static
model cannot explain the case where the initial beliefs of the firms are not at one of the steady
states nor can it explain why firms start to have different beliefs about the different identifiable
groups of workers. This static framework is also unable to address why inequality is persistent.
These types of questions can only be answered in a dynamic environment.
2.3 The general dynamic model
Now I adapt the static model of Section 2.2 into a dynamic environment. I start by constructing
a discrete dynamic system and from there I approximate the continuous dynamic system by
taking limits with respect to the length of the period. Starting with a discrete system is
preferred as there is a distinct timing to the way that the game unfolds in each period.
With this dynamic system I am able to address the many questions left unanswered in the
static framework. Specifically, I find that the paths to the steady states create the possibility
for persistent inequality and that differing group expectations can explain the situation where
groups end up at different steady states despite initial firm beliefs being equal across groups.
I also address the relationship between the equilibria of the static model and the steady states
of the dynamic model, finding that they are equivalent.
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2.3.1 The economic environment
Firms and workers
Many of the details of the static model carry over to the dynamic model. Specifically, there are
two firms competing for workers from two observable groups. These workers have the option
to make a one-time investment in human capital that is unobservable to the employers. The
cost associated with becoming qualified varies across workers and is distributed according to
G(c). In order to fully develop a dynamic model, some additional details are necessary.
I index the time by t, which is a continuous variable. Changes in this model occur at
the start of each period. Firms are short-lived, and workers are long-lived and subject to a
Poisson death process with parameter β. Given that periods have length ∆, a fraction ∆β
of the workers are replaced by newborn individuals in each period. Individuals also discount
future pay-offs at a rate r, which is strictly positive. Workers have the one time option to invest
in human capital and become qualified in the period they are born; once a worker is qualified
he can never become unqualified. Just as in the static model there are two identifiable groups
of workers and the total population of each group is constant at λJ , where λW + λB = 1.
The length of the period also affects the productivity of the firms. Each firm’s per period
output is given by Y∆(St, Ct) = ∆[αsSt + αcCt], where Ct is the number of qualified workers
employed in the complex task in the period starting at time t and St is the total number of
workers employed in the simple task in the period starting at time t.
Information technology
Firms cannot observe whether a worker is qualified, nor are they able to distinguish between
new and old workers. The only information a firm has about a worker at any given time, aside
from his group identity, is his current signal θt ∈ [0, 1], which is distributed according to fu
if a worker is unqualified or fq if a worker is qualified. Π
J
t represents the firms’ belief about
what fraction of the J population is qualified in a given period. The posterior probability that
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a worker from group J with signal θt is qualified given beliefs Π
J
t is
p(θt,Π
J
t ) ≡
ΠJt fq(θt)
ΠJt fq(θt) + (1−ΠJt )fu(θt)
. (2.10)
2.3.2 The game
The timing of each period of the dynamic game is as follows: In the first stage, firms post
wage and task assignment rules just as in the static model. At the same time, ∆β new
workers enter the workforce and decide whether or not to invest in human capital and become
qualified. Nature then assigns a signal to each worker in accordance with the appropriate
density. Finally, all workers observe the task and wage assignments and decide where to work.
Tasks are performed and then ∆β of the workers exit the workforce.
2.3.3 Equilibria
There are two main components to an equilibrium of this game. First, firms and workers must
behave optimally in each period. That is, the firms employ both an optimal task assignment
rule and an equilibrium wage assignment rule in each period. While, the members of each
new cohort of workers invest only if their expected lifetime benefit at the time of birth exceeds
their cost, and all workers choose firms in a sequentially rational way after any history of
play. Second, firms have rational beliefs about the proportion of qualified workers in each
period. Formally, an equilibrium of this model is described by a sequence of rational firm
beliefs regarding the proportion of qualified workers in each group,
{
ΠJt
}∞
t=0
for J = B,W .
The dynamic system
In order to develop the dynamic system that describes the equilibria, I must first address the
optimal behavior of both the firms and the workers. In any equilibria the firms’ beliefs about
the proportion of a group that is qualified will equal the true investment rate; I use Πt to
represent both of these values.
From the perspective of the firms, each period of the dynamic game looks like the static
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game of Section 2.2 with the exception of the aforementioned production technology adjust-
ment. Consequently, the equilibrium task assignment rule for each period will be identical to
that of the static model and the wage assignment rule is only slightly modified to account for
the period length. It is without loss of generality to focus on task assignment rules with the
threshold property. In the period starting at time t the optimal threshold is
θˆ(ΠJt ) =

1 if αcp(1,Π
J
t ) ≤ αs
0 if αcp(0,Π
J
t ) ≥ αs,
the unique solution to
αcp(θt,Π
J
t ) = αs if αcp(0,Π
J
t ) < αs < αcp(1,Π
J
t ),
(2.11)
and the continuation wage is
ω∆(θt,Π
J
t ) =
 ∆αs if θ < θˆ(Π
J
t )
∆αcp(θt,Π
J
t ) if θ ≥ θˆ(ΠJt ).
(2.12)
Note that ω∆(θt,Π
J
t ) = ∆ω(θt,Π
J
t ), where ω(θt,Π
J
t ) is as in (2.7).
Some slight adjustments to the other relevant functions are also necessary. I define the
unit period gain from investment as a worker’s one period gain from investment given a period
with length one. This is equivalent to the gain from investment in the static model and can
be written as
γ(ΠJt ) = αs[Fq(θˆ(Π
J
t ))− Fu(θˆ(ΠJt ))] + αc
∫ 1
θˆ(ΠJt )
p(θ,ΠJt )[fq(θ)− fu(θ)]dθ. (2.13)
Given that the length of a period is ∆, I can write the per period gain from investment as
∆γ(ΠJt ).
The lifetime gain from investment from the perspective of a worker at time t is simply the
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discounted sum of all future per period gains from investment. It can be written as
ΓJt =
∞∑
g=0
(1−∆β −∆r)g∆γ(ΠJt+g∆)
= (1−∆β −∆r)ΓJt+∆ + ∆γ(ΠJt ). (2.14)
Rearranging (2.14) yields
ΓJt+∆ − ΓJt
∆
= (β + r)ΓJt+∆ − γ(ΠJt ). (2.15)
If I let ∆→ 0, then I can express how the lifetime gain from investment evolves over time with
the following differential equation:
Γ˙Jt = (β + r)Γ
J
t − γ(ΠJt ). (2.16)
A worker’s optimal strategy is to invest in human capital if his lifetime gain from investment
at the time of birth exceeds his cost of investment. Workers can invest only in the period that
they are born, so the investment rate of any cohort is fixed after the period of birth. Using
this fact, I can address how the investment rate of each group’s population will develop over
time. The proportion of new J population births in the period starting at time t that will
invest is G(ΓJt ).
Given the Poisson death process and the assumption that the total population is constant,
the investment rate of the entire J population at time t is
ΠJt = (1−∆β)ΠJt−∆ + ∆βG(ΓJt ). (2.17)
Rearranging (2.17) yields
ΠJt −ΠJt−∆
∆
= β
(
G(ΓJt )−ΠJt−∆
)
. (2.18)
If I let ∆→ 0, then I can express how the overall investment rate of group J evolves over time
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with the following differential equation:
Π˙Jt = β
(
G(ΓJt )−ΠJt
)
. (2.19)
I conclude that the equilibria of the dynamic model are characterized by a dynamic system
consisting of (2.16) and (2.19).
Proposition 3. An equilibrium of this dynamic model is fully characterized by the following
two-variable differential equations:
Γ˙Jt = (β + r) Γ
J
t − γ(ΠJt )
Π˙Jt =β
(
G(ΓJt )−ΠJt
)
. (2.20)
This proposition indicates that the difference between the investment rate of the newborn
cohort and the overall investment rate of the group J determines the speed of a firm’s beliefs
about the fraction of workers in group J that are qualified. The change in lifetime gain
from investment is determined by the difference between the discounted lifetime gain from
investment and the unit period gain from investment.
The steady states of the dynamic system can be described as all beliefs satisfying
ΠJ = G
(
γ(ΠJ)
β + r
)
. (2.21)
Describing the steady states like this makes it easy to compare the equilibria of the dynamic
model to those of the static model. It is also useful for addressing the conditions under which
there are multiple steady states.
Existence of multiple steady states
Discrimination in this dynamic model is a result of coordination failure just as in the static
model. Consequently, in order to address the persistence of discrimination it is necessary to
establish that it is possible for the dynamic system in Proposition 3 to have multiple steady
states.
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(a) Demonstrates how lifetime gain from
investment reacts to the proportion of investors.
(b) Demonstrates how the proportion of investors
reacts to lifetime gain from investment.
Figure 2.2: Loci of the general dynamic model
Figure 2.2 shows the two loci of interest in the general dynamic model and the associated
directional arrows. The first panel depicts a potential Γ˙Jt = 0 locus. See Section 2.2.3 for a
discussion of the potential values of γ(Π). The arrows indicate that to the right of the locus,
when ΓJ >
γ(ΠJt )
β+r , Γ
J is increasing. To the left of the locus ΓJ is decreasing. The second
panel of depicts the Π˙Jt = 0 locus. The shape of this locus is a result of the assumption that
G(·) is continuous and strictly increasing. The arrows indicate that above this locus, when
G(ΓJt ) < Π
J
t , Π
J
t is increasing and below it the locus it is decreasing.
In Figure 2.3 I combine the two graphs of Figure 2.2. Examining the two loci of the dynamic
system demonstrates that, as in the static case, for any fu and fq that satisfy the monotone
likelihood ratio and any technology parameters I can find a non-trivial set of G(·) functions
that ensure multiple steady states. I have drawn the figure to demonstrate a case in which
there are three steady states; from now on I denote these three steady states as Σl(Γl,Πl),
Σm(Γm,Πm), and Σh(Γh,Πh) referring to the low, middle, and high steady states, respectively.
Now that I have established the possibility of multiple solutions to (2.21), I can show that
the steady states are Pareto rankable.
Proposition 4. Let Π∗ be the largest solution to (2.21). Then Σ(Γ,Π) = Σ
(
γ(Π∗)
β+r ,Π
∗
)
Pareto
dominates all other steady states of the model.
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Figure 2.3: Phase diagram of the dynamic system
Proof. Suppose that Π1 and Π2 solve (2.21) and let Π1 < Π2. If the system is initially at the
low investment level Π1, then I can show that if beliefs increase to Π2 all workers are strictly
better off even before changing their investment behavior. The change in the lifetime expected
wage of a qualified worker when beliefs increase from Π1 to Π2 is
1
β + r
∫
ωJ(θ; Π2)fq(θ)− 1
β + r
∫
ωJ(θ; Π1)fq(θ)
=
αs
β + r
∫ θˆ(Π2)
0
fq(θ)dθ − αs
β + r
∫ θˆ(Π1)
0
fq(θ)dθ
+
αc
β + r
∫ 1
θˆ(Π2)
p(θ,Π2)fq(θ)dθ − αc
β + r
∫ 1
θˆ(Π1)
p(θ,Π1)fq(θ)dθ
=
1
β + r
(∫ θˆ(Π1)
θˆ(Π2)
[αcp(θ,Π
2)− αs]fq(θ)dθ
+ αc
∫ 1
θˆ(Π1)
(p(θ,Π2)− p(θ,Π1))fq(θ)dθ
)
> 0. (2.22)
Thus, the lifetime wage of those who invested in the original steady state is strictly im-
proved by a move to the higher steady state. A similar argument can be made to show
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that 1β+r
∫
ωJ(θ; Π2)fu(θ) >
1
β+r
∫
ωJ(θ; Π1)fu(θ), which implies that the lifetime wage of
those who did not invest in the original steady state is also strictly improved by a move to the
higher steady state.
If workers are given the option to alter their investment decisions after the change in firm
beliefs, then all workers who choose to do so will be strictly better off. This is implied as
workers must behave optimally when making investment decisions. I conclude that if workers
are given a choice of Π1 or Π2, they all prefer the higher Π2. By revealed preference, the steady
state with the largest Π that solves (2.21) is Pareto dominant.
Relationship between the dynamic and static equilibria
Proposition 3 indicates that all steady states of the dynamic system are characterized by
beliefs satisfying ΠJ = G
(
γ(ΠJ )
β+r
)
. Section 2.2 concludes that all equilibria of the static model
are characterized by beliefs satisfying piJ = G(γ(piJ)). The only difference between these two
conditions is that in the dynamic model a worker’s optimal decision to invest is based on the
lifetime gain from investment rather than the unit period gain from investment. This similarity
in conditions can also be seen by comparing Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.3. In these two figures
the s-shaped curves are identical. The hump-shaped curve of Figure 2.3 is just a scaled, by
1
β+r , version of the curve in Figure 2.1.
A meaningful comparison of the static equilibria and the steady states of the dynamic
model requires that the expected benefit from investment be equivalent across models. A
slight adjustment to the production function of the static model achieves this goal. If I scale
the production of the static model to Y˜ (S,C) = 1β+r [αsS + αcC], then the optimal threshold
is unchanged and the continuation wage is updated to
ωJ(θ, piJ) =

αs
β+r if θ < θˆ(pi
J)
αc
β+rp(θ, pi
J) if θ ≥ θˆ(piJ).
(2.23)
This updated static wage is comparable to the lifetime wage of the dynamic model. Con-
sequently, the new gain from investment in this static model is γ(pi
J )
β+r , where γ(pi
J) is as in
23
(2.8).
Under this slightly adjusted static model the equilibria are characterized by all pairs of
beliefs, (piB, piW ), satisfying
piJ = G
(
γ(piJ)
β + r
)
for J = B,W. (2.24)
This new condition is identical to the steady state condition for the dynamic model. So, when
the expected benefit from investment is equivalent across the two models, the static equilibria
will equal the steady states of the dynamic model.
Stability of the steady states
Before I can talk about the situations in which discrimination is persistent, it is necessary to
determine which of the steady states are stable and what the paths to those stable steady
states look like. From now on I assume that G(·) is such that there are three steady states
Σl(Γl,Πl), Σm(Γm,Πm), and Σh(Γh,Πh). This is the case of most interest. However, all of the
results that follow can be generalized to cases with more than three steady states.
Lemma 2. Among the three steady states Σl(Γl,Πl) and Σh(Γh,Πh) are saddle points and
Σm(Γm,Πm) is a source.
Proof. The linearization of the dynamic system in Proposition 3 around a steady state (Π¯, Γ¯)
is
Γ˙ = (β + r)Γ¯− γ(Π¯) + (β + r)(Γt − Γ¯)− γ′(Π¯)(Πt − Π¯)
Π˙ = β(G(Γ¯)− Π¯)− β(Πt − Π¯) + βG′(Γ¯)(Γt − Γ¯). (2.25)
Substituting in for Γ¯ = γ(Π¯)β+r and Π¯ = G(Γ¯) gives
Γ˙ = γ′(Π¯)(Π¯−Πt) + (β + r)(Γt − Γ¯)
Π˙ = βG′(Γ¯)(Γt − Γ¯) + β(Π¯−Πt). (2.26)
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The Jacobian matrix evaluated at a steady state is
JE ≡
 β + r −γ′
βG′ −β

(Γ¯,Π¯).
(2.27)
The trace of this matrix is trJE = r, and the determinant is |JE | = −β(β + r) + βγ′G′. Since
trJE is positive, every steady state is unstable. In order for a steady state to be a saddle point
the eigenvalues must be of opposite signs. The eigenvalues of this system are:
φ1, φ2 =
r ±√r2 − 4β[(γ′G′)− (β + r)]
2
(2.28)
If 4β[γ′G′ − (β + r)] < 0 the eigenvalues will be of opposite signs. This condition can be
rewritten as: γ
′
β+r <
1
G′ .
For a steady state to be a saddle point, the slope of G must be less than that of the inverse
of Γt at the steady state. Referencing Figure 2.3, it is apparent that both Σl and Σh are
saddle points. This inequality does not hold for the middle steady state. Both eigenvalues are
positive at Σm, so it is either an unstable node or an unstable focus.
As Σm(Γm,Πm) is a source, it is possible to determine the conditions under which the
dynamic paths around it spiral out. Spiralling paths are of interest because they create a
region of initial firm beliefs that can lead to either of the saddle stable steady states. If paths
do not spiral, this region does not exist and historical beliefs completely determine the outcome
for each group. I refer to such paths as deterministic paths.
Lemma 3. If (r+2β)
2
β < 4γ
′G′|(Γm,Πm) holds, then equilibrium paths spiral out in the neighbor-
hood of Σm. Otherwise, paths are deterministic.
Proof. For a steady state to be a unstable node the eigenvalues must be complex conjugate.
This occurs when
r2 − 4β[(γ′G′)− (β + r)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
from Lemma 2
< 0. (2.29)
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Rearranging (2.29) yields
(r + 2β)2
β
< 4γ′G′. (2.30)
Corollary 1. As r decreases it becomes increasing more likely that the dynamic paths spiral
out in the neighborhood of Σm(Γm,Πm).
Proof. The left hand side of (2.30) is increasing in r. So the smaller r is, the more likely it is
that (2.30) will hold. Note also that as r decreases 4β[γ′G′ − (β + r)] > 0 will still hold.
This Corollary suggests that the less workers discount future pay-offs the less likely it is
that initial firm beliefs will control the final outcome for each group.
The analysis of the paths to the saddle points is done under the assumption that workers
discount the future at a positive rate r > 0. It is interesting to briefly consider what happens
without this assumption. If r = 0 the paths leading from Σm are no longer spiralling, instead
they form closed circles around the steady state. In this case Σm is a center and it is stable
and Σh and Σl are saddle points. The situation in which the steady state changes stability
and a unique limit cycle bifurcates from it is called a subcritical Andronov-Hopf bifurcation.
See Kuznetsov (2006) for more information on dynamic systems with this property.
These stability results can easily be extended to a case where there are more than three
steady states. In this particular model, as a result of the shape of the γ function, there will
always be an odd number of steady states. Suppose for example that there are five steady
states. In this case the first, third and fifth steady states, counting up from the one with
the lowest investment rate, will be saddle paths while the second and fourth will be sources.
Depending on the parameter values, the paths from these two sources may be deterministic or
spiralling.
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Persistence of inequality
Now that I have identified which of the steady states are saddle points and the forms that the
dynamic paths to the high and low steady states can take, I am able to determine the initial
conditions that have the potential to yield persistent discrimination. In this dynamic setting,
discrimination occurs when one group is at the high steady state while the other is at the
low steady state. Persistent discrimination occurs when discrimination is present and neither
group is able to move from their current steady state to another.
Since paths to the high and low steady states can take two forms depending on the pa-
rameters, there are two cases to address. When paths are deterministic, historical firms beliefs
are the only factor that determine a group’s final outcome. On the other hand, when paths
form interlocking spirals, historical firm beliefs may be indecisive and the expectations of the
workers will determine the final outcome.
I refer to a group as disadvantaged if initial firm beliefs are such that the group can only
converge to the low steady state. Conversely, a group is advantaged if firm beliefs lead them
only to the high steady state. When paths are deterministic, all groups are either advantaged or
disadvantaged. When paths are spiralling, it is possible for a group to be neither advantaged
nor disadvantaged. In this case, the final outcome is determined by whether the group is
optimistic or pessimistic about the future.
When the dynamic paths are deterministic, the steady state that a particular group con-
verges to is entirely dependent on initial investment behavior. Figure 2.4 depicts potential
deterministic paths to the high and low steady states. From this figure it is clear that as
long as initial firm beliefs about one group are above those of the middle steady state while
initial firm beliefs about the other group are below, there will be discrimination as defined
above. Put more simply, discrimination occurs if one group is advantaged while the other is
disadvantaged. Discrimination will always be persistent when paths are deterministic since
there is no way for a group to move from one steady state to another.
Proposition 5. If the dynamic paths to the high and low steady states are deterministic, then
discrimination is persistent.
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Figure 2.4: Deterministic paths to the steady states
Proof. This result is proven directly by the paths in Figure 2.4.
When the dynamic paths are spiralling, initial firm beliefs are potentially indecisive. If
this is the case, then the steady state a group converges to will be determined by the group’s
expectations about future payoffs rather than by historical firm beliefs.
Figure 2.5 depicts potential spiralling paths to the saddle points. I denote the upper
boundary of the dynamic path to the low steady state as Πˆ. Note that this upper bound
occurs as the path crosses the Π˙ = 0 locus. The figure indicates that if initial firm beliefs
about a group are in the range [0, Πˆ], then that group can converge to the low steady state. I
denote the lower boundary of the dynamic path to the high steady state as Πˇ. This bottom
bound also occurs as the path crosses the Π˙ = 0 locus. If initial firm beliefs about a group are
in the range [Πˇ, 1], then it is possible for that group to converge to the high steady state.
When Πˆ is greater than Πˇ, the spiralling paths create a range of initial firm beliefs that
can lead to either the high or the low steady state depending on what path the group is on.
This range is indicated by the purple area in Figure 2.5. The directional arrows of Figure 2.3
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Figure 2.5: Spiralling paths to the steady states
and the assumption that paths to the steady states are spiralling imply that this range will
always exist.
Definition 1. The range of initial firm beliefs [Πˇ, Πˆ] is called the “uncertain region”. If initial
firm beliefs about the investment rate of a group are in this range, then that group can converge
to either Σh(Πh,Γh) or Σl(Πl,Γl).
If initial firm beliefs are in the uncertain region, then the steady state that a group converges
to is determined by the expectations of the workers in that group. If a group develops and
shares an optimistic view of the future, then they will converge to the high steady state; if they
develop a pessimistic view, they will converge to the low steady state. So, these expectations
determine the path that a group will take. Consequently, I refer to the path that leads to the
high steady state as the optimistic path and the path that leads to the low steady state as the
pessimistic path. The existence of these two paths explains the situation where firms initially
view the two groups as identical, in terms of average investment rate, but the groups end up
at different steady states.
Given initial firm beliefs that are outside of the uncertain region, the steady state that a
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group converges to will depend entirely on historical firm beliefs. In particular, when initial
beliefs about a group’s average investment behavior are are in the range (Πˆ, 1], indicated by
the pink region, then the group will converge to the high steady state with certainty. This is
because the optimistic path is the only reasonable path to take from this starting point; put
more simply, Σh is the only achievable saddle point.
Definition 2. The range of initial firm beliefs [Πˆ, 1] is called the “certain region for Σh”. If
initial firm beliefs about the investment rate of a group are in this range, then that group can
only converge to Σh(Πh,Γh).
Groups with initial firm beliefs in the certain region for Σh are advantaged since history, rather
than optimism, causes them to converge to the high steady state.
If initial firm beliefs are in the range [0, Πˇ), indicated by the blue region, then group J will
converge to the low steady state with certainty.
Definition 3. The range of initial firm beliefs [0, Πˇ] is called the “certain region for Σl”. If
initial firm beliefs about the investment rate of a group are in this range, then that group can
only converge to Σl(Πl,Γl).
Groups with initial firm beliefs in the certain region for Σl are disadvantaged since history,
rather than pessimism, causes them to converge to the low steady state.
If the two saddle stable steady states lie inside of their respective certain regions, then, once
reached, a group is permanently stuck in their steady state. The following lemma indicates
that it is always the case that the high and low steady states lie outside of the uncertain region,
implying that discrimination is persistent when paths are spiralling.
Lemma 4. If dynamic paths to the high and low steady states are spiralling, then Πh > Πˆ and
Πl < Πˇ.
Proof. Fix the optimistic path. Note that Π is increasing to the right of the Π˙ = 0 locus and
decreasing to the left of it. Consequently, Πˆ must occur when the pessimistic path crosses the
Π˙ = 0 locus. Suppose that Πh ≤ Πˆ, then the pessimistic path must cross the optimistic path
(see Figure 2.5 for clarification). Dynamic paths cannot cross (see de la Fuente (2000), page
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402), so it must be the case that the uppermost part of the pessimistic path lies below Πh. I
conclude that Πh > Πˆ.
Fix the pessimistic path; Πˇ will occur when the optimistic path crosses the Π˙ = 0 locus.
Suppose that Πl ≥ Πˇ, then the optimistic path must cross the pessimistic path. Dynamic
paths cannot cross, so it must be the case that the lowermost part of the optimistic path lies
above the Πl. I conclude that Πl < Πˇ.
When paths to the high and low steady states are spiralling there are four classes of
initial conditions that lead to discrimination. If initial firm beliefs are such that one group
is disadvantaged while the other is advantaged, then discrimination is certain (just as in the
case of deterministic paths). Alternatively, if initial firm beliefs are in the uncertain region for
both groups, then discrimination can occur as long as one group is optimistic while the other
is pessimistic. There will also be discrimination if beliefs and expectations are such that one
group is advantaged and the other is pessimistic or if one group is disadvantaged while the
other is optimistic. These last two cases are interesting because both history and expectations
are impacting the final outcome. No matter how the discrimination occurs it will be persistent.
Proposition 6. If the dynamic paths to the high and low steady states are spiralling, then
discrimination is persistent.
Proof. This result is directly implied by Lemma 4.
Propositions 5 and 6 indicate that discrimination, once present, will always be persistent in
this model. The analysis also shows that both historical firm beliefs and group expectations can
lead to inequality, depending on the shape of the dynamic paths. Furthermore, the existence
of spiralling paths to the high and low steady states provides an explanation for the situation
where firms have similar or identical beliefs across groups but the two groups converge to
different steady states. Thus, the questions that were unanswerable in the static model have
now been addressed in this dynamic framework.
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2.4 The simple dynamic model
In this section, I develop a simple form of the dynamic model and I examine two specific
parameterizations that generate three steady states. A group’s expectations about the future
may play a role in the final outcome in the first parameterization. While, initial firm beliefs
are decisive in the second parameterization. Using these two parameterizations, I am able to
examine the impact that the precision of signals, the productivity of workers, the discount rate
and the rate of population turnover have on the existence of three steady states and on the
importance of group expectations.
2.4.1 Firms and workers
Firms face the same linear per period production function as in Section 2.3.1. For simplicity,
workers have only two possible signals: θH and θL, where θH > θL. If a worker is qualified, he
receives a signal of θH with probability Pq >
1
2 and a signal of θL with probability 1 − Pq. If
a worker is unqualified, he receives a signal of θL with probability Pu >
1
2 and a signal of θH
with probability 1 − Pu. I assume the cost of investment is distributed uniformly over [c, c].
Time in this simple model is discrete, so ∆ = 1.
2.4.2 The updated dynamic system
The equilibria of this example are characterized by the same dynamic system as in Proposition
3. Given the parameterization, I can find more specific forms of the relevant functions. The
updated optimal threshold rule is
θˆ(ΠJt ) =

1 if ΠJt ≤ Π
θH if Π < Π
J
t < Π
0 if ΠJt ≥ Π,
(2.31)
where Π and Π are calculated by updating θˆ(ΠJt ); they are
Π =
αs(1− Pu)
αs(1− Pu) + (αc − αs)Pq and Π =
αsPu
αsPu + (αc − αs)(1− Pq) . (2.32)
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Given the optimal task assignment rule in (2.31), the unit period gain from investment is
updated to
γ(ΠJt ) =

0 if ΠJt ≤ Π
(Pq + Pu − 1)(αcP (θH ,ΠJt )− αs) if Π < ΠJt < Π
αc(Pq + Pu − 1)(P (θH ,ΠJt )− P (θL,ΠJt )) if ΠJt ≥ Π.
(2.33)
The posterior probability that a worker with signal θH is qualified is
P (θH ,Π
J
t ) =
ΠJt Pq
ΠJt Pq + (1−ΠJt )(1− Pu)
, (2.34)
and the posterior probability that a worker with signal θL is qualified is
P (θL,Π
J
t ) =
ΠJt (1− Pq)
ΠJt (1− Pq) + (1−ΠJt )Pu
. (2.35)
The two loci of the dynamic system are now ΓJt =
γ(ΠJt )
β+r , where γ(Π
J
t ) is as in (2.33), and
ΠJt = G(Γ
J
t ), where G is the uniform distribution over [c, c].
2.4.3 Example 1: Spiralling paths
I start by examining a parametric example of the simple dynamic model that yields three
steady states and dynamic paths that spiral out from the middle state to the high and low
steady states. The values of the relevant variables are: Pq = 2/3, Pu = 2/3, αs = 1, αc = 2,
β = 0.2, r = 0.05, c = −0.1 and c = 0.9. Figure 2.6 demonstrates the phase diagram
for the simple dynamic model under these parameters. There are three steady states and,
following the convention from the previous section, I denote these as Σl(Γl,Πl), Σm(Γm,Πm),
and Σh(Γh,Πh). The directional arrows of the phase diagram indicate that Σh and Σl are
saddle points and Σm is an unstable source.
Figure 2.7 demonstrates the spiralling paths to the two saddle points. The steady state
beliefs in this example are Πl = 0.1, Πm = 0.47, and Πh = 0.76. The paths are generated by
inducting backwards from the high and low steady states using the equations in (2.14) and
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Figure 2.6: Phase diagram for example 1
Figure 2.7: Spiralling paths to the steady states
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(2.17). The figure indicates that there is an uncertain region (the purple area) that results
from the spiralling paths. There are also certain regions for both Σh (the pink area) and Σl
(the blue area). Most importantly, because the high and low steady states are outside of the
uncertain region, discrimination in this simple example will be persistent.
Using the simple dynamic model, I can also examine how changes in the various parameters
of the model impact the presence of the three steady states holding the other parameter values
constant. Figure 2.8 has three panels indicating the regions of Pu and Pq; αs and αc; and β
and r that lead to the existence of a high, middle, and low steady state. In each of these panels
the light red region indicates the parameter values that generate a low steady state. The grey
region indicates the parameter values that generate a high steady state. Where these regions
overlap, as indicated by the dark red region, the simple dynamic model has three steady states.
The first panel of Figure 2.8 demonstrates the values of Pu and Pq for which three steady
states will be present. The figure indicates that there are three steady states when signals are
of intermediate precision. When signals are very precise, only the high steady state is present
and when signals are very noisy, only the low steady state is present.
The second panel of Figure 2.8 demonstrates the impact that the productivity of workers
has on the existence of multiple steady states. I assume to start that αs < αc or else the model
is trivial. This figure indicates that when the productivity of workers in the two tasks is very
similar, then there is only one steady state with a relatively low investment rate. This makes
sense as the productivity determines the wage in this model and similar wages across tasks
make investment unattractive. If the productivity of the complex task is much larger than
that of the simple task, then there is only one steady state where a relatively large proportion
of the population is qualified. This stems from the significant wage differential that will arise
across tasks when productivity differences are large.
The third panel of Figure 2.8 demonstrates how the speed of population turn over, β, and
the workers’ discount rate, r, impact the existence of multiple steady states. I assume to start
that β + r ≤ 1. The figure indicates that there is no β or r that can eliminate the low steady
state, so there is no exclusively red region in this panel. If β or r is very large, then there is
only one steady state at a low level of investment. If, on the other hand, β or r is low, there
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Figure 2.8: Impact of the parameter values on the existence of the steady states
Figure 2.9: Impact of the parameter values on the shape of the dynamic paths
are three steady states.
Figure 2.9 details how the various parameters of the model impact the shape of the paths
to the high and low steady states. There are three panels indicating the values of Pu and Pq;
αs and αc; and β and r that generate spiralling paths and deterministic paths to the high and
low steady states. Each of these three panels shows the region of the parameter values that
allow for three steady states, as determined in Figure 2.8, and breaks it down into the values
that meet the conditions of Lemma 3 and the values that do not. The dark purple indicates
values that create the potential for group expectations to determine final outcome, while the
light purple indicates the values for which historical firm beliefs are decisive.
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The first panel of Figure 2.9 demonstrates the values of Pu and Pq there will be spiralling
paths to the high and low steady states. The second panel does the same for αs and αc. These
panels indicate that, in this particular example, all values of Pu and Pq and of αs and αc that
allow for three steady states also meet the requirements for spiralling paths.
The third panel of Figure 2.9 demonstrates the impact that β and r have on the shape
of the paths to the high and low steady states. This relationship was already mentioned in
Corollary 1. This panel is slightly different from the first two because there are values of β
and r that yield three steady states but do not meet the conditions necessary for spiralling
paths. This panel makes it clear that for high r values or low β values there can be three
steady states, but the initial firm beliefs will determine the steady state a group converges to.
An example with deterministic paths is discussed in the next subsection.
2.4.4 Example 2: Deterministic paths
It is also interesting to examine a parametric example of the simple dynamic model that yields
three steady states with deterministic paths to the high and low steady states. The values of
the relevant variables are: Pq = 19/20, Pu = 1/2, αs = 1, αc = 2, β = 0.5, r = 0.5, c = −0.1
and c = 0.4. Figure 2.10 demonstrates the relevant loci and the dynamic paths to the two
saddle stable steady states. Following the convention from the previous section, I denote the
three steady states as Σl(Γl,Πl), Σm(Γm,Πm), and Σh(Γh,Πh). The steady state beliefs in
this example are Πl = 0.2, Πm = 0.54, and Πh = 0.92. The paths are generated by inducting
backwards from the high and low steady states using the equations in (2.14) and (2.17). In
this parameterization the paths are deterministic; there is no uncertain region and historical
beliefs are decisive.
Again, I can examine the different parameter values that generate three steady states and
that generate spiralling paths to the high and low steady states. Figure 2.11 demonstrates the
regions of Pu and Pq; αs and αc; and β and r that yield three steady states. These results look
very similar to the previous example with the grey regions indicating parameter values that
lead to a high steady state and the light red regions indicating parameter values that lead to
a low steady state.
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Figure 2.10: Deterministic paths to the steady states
This second example confirms the previous conclusion that moderately precise signals are
more likely to generate three steady states. It also confirms the fact that three steady states
are more likely the larger is the difference between the productivity of the complex task and
the simple task. The third panel of Figure 2.11 indicates that for all values of β + r ≤ 1 there
will be three steady states. In this example, the rate of population turn over and the discount
rate of the population have no effect on the existence of three steady states. This stems from
the fact that signals for qualified workers are very precise while signals for unqualified workers
are imprecise.
Figure 2.12 demonstrates the regions of the different parameter values that generate the
two types of dynamic paths. The results are more interesting than those for the previous
example. For all three panels there are regions in which there can be three steady states and
deterministic paths, indicated by the light purple region of the panel. There are also regions
where there can be three steady states and spiralling paths, indicated by the dark purple
region. This was not the case in the Example 1. This result stems from the different set of
parameter values in this example. Particularly the fact that the signals are more precise for
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Figure 2.11: Impact of the parameter values on the existence the steady states
Figure 2.12: Impact of the parameter values on the shape of the dynamic paths
qualified workers than for unqualified and the fact that the rate of population turnover is large
make it more likely that historical firm beliefs will determine the steady state that a group
converges to.
2.5 Rationalizing the existence of multiple saddle points
It may not seem clear how to interpret the existence of two saddle points or how a group can
converge to one or the other depending on expectations. In order to rationalize the two paths
to the saddle points, I make a slight adjustment to the simple dynamic model. Rather than
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Figure 2.13: The dynamic system and the paths to Σh and Σl when costs are discrete
costs being distributed uniformly, I assume that some proportion of the population, l, is born
qualified, or have zero cost of investment so that they always invest. While some proportion
of the population, h, has an extremely high cost of investment and will never invest. The rest
of the population, 1− l − h, has an intermediate cost of investment, c.
By selecting the values: l = 0.1, h = 0.76, c = 0.37, Pq = 2/3, Pu = 2/3, αs = 1, αc = 2,
β = 0.2 and r = 0.05, I can generate the same three steady states as in Example 1. The only
change to the dynamic system is that the Π˙ = 0 locus is now a step function, as depicted in
Figure 2.13.
Suppose that initial firm beliefs are those of the unstable middle steady state. That is
ΠJ0 = 0.47. The only workers that are of interest in this demonstration are those that have a
cost c. The behavior of the other types of workers is predetermined. The optimal behavior of
a worker with an intermediate cost is to invest if lifetime gain from investment, Γ(ΠJ), exceeds
c.
To start, consider a worker with an intermediate cost of investment, and suppose that
this worker is extremely pessimistic and believes that all workers with intermediate costs will
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choose not to invest. I can calculate the series of firm beliefs that the worker anticipates
given this pessimism as
{
ΠPt
}∞
t=0
, where initial beliefs are ΠP0 = 0.47 and all following beliefs
are calculated as ΠPt = (1 − β)ΠPt−1 + βl. Under these most pessimistic beliefs, the worker
has a lifetime gain from investment of ΓP0 = 0.13. This is less than the cost of investment,
c = 0.37, so the worker will not invest. Thus, given that a worker believes that all workers
with intermediate costs will not invest, his optimal behavior is to not invest. Figure 2.13
demonstrates the path that will be taken to the low steady state if all workers with cost c are
pessimistic in this way.
Consider instead that the worker is optimistic and believes that all workers with inter-
mediate costs will invest. The series of expected firm beliefs under these assumptions are{
ΠOt
}∞
t=0
, where again initial beliefs are ΠO0 = 0.47 and all following beliefs are calculated
as ΠOt = (1 − β)ΠOt−1 + βh. In this case, the worker has a lifetime gain from investment of
ΓO0 = 0.59, which exceeds his investment cost, so he will choose to invest. I can conclude that
if a worker believes that all workers with intermediate costs will invest, his optimal behavior
is to invest as well. Figure 2.13 demonstrates the path that will be taken to the high steady
state if all workers with cost c are optimistic in this way. This simple demonstration shows
clearly how group expectations can determine the path that a group takes to a steady state.
2.6 Concluding remarks
The two main contributions of this paper are to establish the initial conditions that lead
to discrimination and to determine when this discrimination will be persistent. There are
two potential forms that the paths to the relevant steady states can take. If the paths are
deterministic, then there will be inequality as long as initial firms beliefs are above Πm for
one group and below for the other; this discrimination will always be persistent. If paths are
spiralling and initial firm beliefs are in the uncertain region, it will be the collective group
expectations that determine the final outcome. If beliefs are outside of this region, then group
expectations have no bearing on the final outcome and as in the deterministic case, historical
firm beliefs are decisive. Discrimination is always persistent when paths are spiralling.
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In the framework of a simplified version of the dynamic model, I determine how the pa-
rameter values affect the existence of three steady states and the shapes of the paths to those
steady states. I find that the rate of population turn over and the discount rate of the workers
are the main driving forces behind the form that the dynamic paths take. Similarly, the pre-
cision of signals regarding worker quality and the productivity of workers in the complex and
simple tasks are the parameters that have the most impact on the existence of three steady
states.
Another contribution of this paper is to address the dynamics of discrimination in a com-
petitive environment. Allowing for competitive wages means workers in different groups that
are assigned to the same task and have the same signal may have different wages. So, in-
equality in this model can occur via both the task assignment and the wage. A competitive
environment also allows for a more realistic analysis of potential policies designed to eliminate
discrimination and makes it possible to perform meaningful welfare analysis in future research.
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Chapter 3
Eliminating persistent statistical discrimination: an analysis of several
policy options
3.1 Introduction
This paper revisits the dynamic model of statistical discrimination developed in Chapter 2 and
analyzes the effectiveness of three government policies designed to eliminate existing persistent
discrimination. By examining these policies in a dynamic framework, I am able to determine
the path that workers in a group will take once a policy is put in place and the point at which
it is safe for the government to remove the policy and still guarantee the eventual elimination
of discrimination. Furthermore, the inclusion of competitive wages in the model means that I
am able to complete meaningful analysis of the welfare effects of the three policies.
I use the dynamic model developed in Chapter 2 as the framework to analyze the three
policies. The model may have three steady states, in which case the middle steady state is
unstable and paths to the high and low steady states emanate from that point. These paths
can take several forms depending on the parameter values. For certain parameterizations, the
dynamic paths create a region of initial firm beliefs, about the average skill level of a group, in
which a group can converge to either the high or the low steady state depending on whether
they are pessimistic or optimistic. For other parameterizations, this region does not exist.
When this is the case, initial firm beliefs about the average skill level of a group are decisive
and group expectations are irrelevant. No matter what form the dynamic paths take, a group
becomes “stuck” in a steady state soon as it is reached.
For the purpose of this analysis, I assume that the economy is experiencing discrimination.
This means that one group of workers, which I refer to as disadvantaged, is stuck in the low
steady state and the other group of workers, which I refer to as advantaged, is stuck in the
high steady state. I examine the impact of three government policies from this starting point.
The goal of these policies it to move the disadvantaged group from the low steady state to the
high steady state.
The first policy I examine is one in which the government offers a hiring subsidy to firms
for correctly assigning skilled workers in the disadvantaged group to the more productive job.
This policy is always effective at eliminating discrimination as long as a large enough subsidy
is offered.
The second policy of interest is an investment voucher offered to workers in the disadvan-
taged group. This voucher defrays the monetary cost associated with skill acquisition. As long
as the monetary costs are high, this policy can eliminate discrimination. If monetary costs
are low, then it may be the case that even the largest effective voucher is unable to eliminate
discrimination.
The last policy is one in which the government enforces equal treatment of workers across
groups. In particular, firms are not allowed to condition wages or job assignments on group
identity. Under this policy, the dynamic system has three steady states. If the proportion of
the population that is in the disadvantaged group is very small, then this policy is guaranteed
to eliminate discrimination. If the groups are close to equal in size, then the policy may
eliminate discrimination, depending on the shape of the paths to the steady states and on
whether the population as a whole is optimistic. If the disadvantaged group is relatively large,
then this policy will have disastrous results.
Using a simple parameterization, I examine the welfare effects of the three policies. I
complete this analysis in a general equilibrium framework. Workers in the advantaged group
are taxed in order to fund the policies. I find that all three policies create a net increase in
welfare while they are in place. However, there are significant differences across policies with
respect to how much the advantaged group is impacted over the course of the policy. The
hiring subsidy results in a very large loss in welfare to the advantaged group, but it moves
the disadvantaged group to the high steady state the fastest. The investment voucher reduces
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the welfare of the advantaged group the least of all the policies and for this reason it may be
viewed as optimal by some policy makers. The equal treatment policy has a moderate impact
of the advantaged group’s welfare and may be viewed as optimal by a policy maker that does
not want to redistribute.
The paper is structured as follows. The related literature is discussed in the remainder of
Section 3.1. The details of the general dynamic model are described in Section 3.2. Section
3.3 develops the equilibria of the dynamic model and addresses the conditions under which
discrimination will be persistent. In Section 3.4, a simple parameterization of the dynamic
model is developed. Section 3.5 describes the three policies and examines their impact on
both the general dynamic model and the simple parameterization. In Section 3.6, I consider
the welfare effects of the three policies for the simple parameterization. Finally, Section 3.7
concludes.
Related Literature
The model presented in this paper is closely related to Coate and Loury (1993) and Moro
and Norman (2003). Coate and Loury (1993) present a model of statistical discrimination
where two ex ante groups may end up in different, Pareto ranked, equilibria. This model
formalizes many of ideas that were originally presented loosely in Arrow (1973), but it makes
the additional assumption that wages are set exogenously. They find that inequality will occur
if the two groups of workers play different equilibria.
Moro and Norman (2003) relax two of the assumptions in Coate and Loury’s model. In
particular, they remove the linearity of the production technology and the exogeneity of wages.
Allowing for curvature in the production function eliminates the separability of groups, thus,
allowing for true interaction effects between groups. Introducing endogenous wages allows
for more meaningful welfare analysis. They find that under these relaxed assumptions the
dominant group will actually gain from discrimination and, as a result, they will be motivated
to ensure its continuation.
There is relatively little literature that addresses discrimination in a dynamic environment.
Fryer (2007), Blume (2006) and Kim and Loury (2009) all develop dynamic models that are
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adaptations of the original Coate and Loury (1993) paper. These models all differ from the
one presented here in two key areas: they do not incorporate endogenous wages nor do they
consider potential policies to eliminate or mitigate discrimination.
3.2 The model
Consider a market where short-lived firms engage in Bertrand style competition for workers in
each period. Time is continuous in this dynamic model and all changes occur at the beginning
of each period of length ∆.
There are two identifiable groups of workers, B(lack) and W(hite), and the total population
of each group is constant at λJ for J = B,W . Workers are long-lived and subject to a Poisson
death process with parameter β. Consequently, at the beginning of each period ∆β of the
existing workers are replaced by newborn individuals. Workers also discount future pay-offs
at a strictly positive rate r. Prior to entering the labor market, each worker has the option to
invest in human capital. Workers who make this investment become qualified and those that
do not remain unqualified. These pre-market investment decisions are final; a worker cannot
choose to invest in human capital later in life.
A worker who invests in human capital incurs a total cost, c. This cost of investment
consists of two important parts: a monetary cost, cm, which is strictly positive and fixed
across all workers and non-monetary cost, ce, which varies across workers. The non-monetary
cost represents both the effort required to become qualified and any value that a worker places
on being qualified (outside of the potential increase in expected wage); it may be positive or
negative.
Total cost of investment will vary across workers because of the differences in ce. I assume
that total cost of investment, c, is distributed over [c, c] ⊆ < according to a continuous and
strictly increasing distribution G(c). Workers are risk neutral and care only about the wage
that they receive and the cost they incur. Pay-offs are additively separable in income and cost
of investment.
Output in each period is generated by the completion of two types of tasks, a simple task
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and a complex task. All workers can perform the simple task, but only those workers who
are qualified can successfully perform the complex task. For a given period starting at t, the
effective input of labor into the simple task, St, is the total number of workers employed in
that task. The effective input of labor into the complex task, Ct, is the number of qualified
workers employed in that task. Both firms’ per period output is given by the linear production
function Y∆(St, Ct) = ∆[αsSt + αcCt], where αc > αs > 0.
Firms cannot observe whether a worker is qualified, nor are they able to distinguish between
new and old workers. The only information a firm has about a worker in a given period, aside
from his group identity, is his current signal θt ∈ [0, 1], which is distributed according to fu if
a worker is unqualified or fq if a worker is qualified. Both densities are bounded away from
zero and, without further loss of generality, fq(θ)/fu(θ) is strictly increasing in θ.
A firm’s prior belief about what proportion of the total J population is qualified at time t
is represented by ΠJt . The posterior probability that a worker from group J with signal θt is
qualified given beliefs ΠJt is
p(θt,Π
J
t ) ≡
ΠJt fq(θ)
ΠJt fq(θ) + (1−ΠJt )fu(θ)
. (3.1)
The strict monotone likelihood ratio property implies that p(θt,Π
J
t ) is strictly increasing in θt
so that a high signal reflects positively on a worker and a low signal negatively. I denote the
associated cumulative distributions by Fq and Fu. I assume a law of large numbers holds so
that these are also the realized frequency distributions of signals for qualified and unqualified
workers, respectively.
The timing of each period of the dynamic game is as follows: In the first stage, ∆β new
workers enter the workforce and decide whether or not to invest in becoming qualified. At
the same time, firms post wage and task assignment rules. Firms may condition wage and
task assignments on θt. Formally, a strategy for each firm is to select some wage schedule
ωJt : [0, 1]→ <+ and a task assignment rule τJt : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] for each group J . In the second
stage, nature assigns a signal θt to each worker according to the appropriate density. Workers
observe the posted wage and task assignment rules and decide where to work. Then tasks are
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performed, wages are paid and output is realized. In the last stage, ∆β of the workers exit the
workforce.
Workers only care about potential wages when comparing job offers and their investment
costs are sunk. So they will choose to work for the firm whose wage and task assignment rule
provides them with the highest wage.
3.3 Equilibria
There are two main components to an equilibria of this game. First, firms and workers must
behave optimally in each period. This means that firms must employ both an optimal task
assignment rule and an equilibrium wage rule in each period. While members of each new
cohort of workers invest only if their expected lifetime benefit at the time of birth exceeds
their cost, and all workers choose firms in a sequentially rational way after any history of
play. Second, firms have rational beliefs about proportion of qualified workers in each period.
Formally, an equilibrium of this model is described by a sequence of rational firm beliefs
regarding the proportion of qualified workers in each group,
{
ΠJt
}∞
t=0
for J = B,W .
Let (ΠBt ,Π
W
t ) denote the group specific investment rates in the period starting at time t.
Given this arbitrary investment behavior by workers, I can address the optimal behavior of
firms in each period. The probability that a worker is qualified, as defined in (3.1), is strictly
increasing in signal. This implies that threshold rules are optimal when assigning workers to
tasks. Under this type of rule, workers with a signal above the threshold are assigned to the
complex task and workers with lower signals are assigned to the simple task. Given a threshold
θ¯Jt for group J at time t the effective input of labor into the complex task is C
J
t = Π
J
t (1−Fq(θ¯Jt ))
and the effective input of labor into the simple task is SJt = Π
J
t Fq(θ¯
J
t ) + (1−ΠJt )Fu(θ¯Jt ).
The optimal threshold is the one which maximizes a firm’s expected output conditional on
investment decisions. Formally, the task assignment problem is
∑
J=B,W
λJ max
θJt ∈[0,1]
(
∆αc
[
ΠJt (1− Fq(θJt ))
]
+ ∆αs
[
ΠJt Fq(θ
J
t ) + (1−ΠJt )Fu(θJt )
])
, (3.2)
which will always have a unique solution.
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Lemma 5. For each group there is a unique θˆ(ΠJt ) ∈ [0, 1] that solves (3.2) for any ΠJt >> 0.
Proof. Let θˆ(ΠJ) be any solution to (3.2). The effective factor inputs into the complex and
simple task are
CJt (Π
J
t ) ≡ΠJt [1− Fq(θˆ(ΠJt ))] and
SJt (Π
J
t ) ≡ΠJt Fq(θˆ(ΠJt )) + (1−ΠJt )Fu(θˆ(ΠJt )) for J = B,W, (3.3)
respectively. Combining the equations of (3.3) yields:
SJt = Π
J
t − CJt + (1−ΠJt )Fu
(
F−1q
(
ΠJt − CJt
ΠJt
))
, (3.4)
which is the maximal level of SJt given C
J
t . I can restate the task assignment problem in (3.2)
as
max
(CJ ,SJ )
[∆αc(λ
BCB + λWCW ) + ∆αs(λ
BSB + λWSW )]
s.t. SJt ≤ ΠJt − CJt + (1−ΠJt )Fu
(
F−1q
(
ΠJt − CJt
ΠJt
))
for J = B,W. (3.5)
The strict monotone likelihood ratio implies that the right hand side of the constraint is a
strictly concave function of CJt . Problem (3.5) is a matter of maximizing a linear function,
that is increasing in both arguments, subject to a strictly concave constraint. This yields a
unique solution.
The linear production function allows for the task assignment problem to be solved sep-
arately for each group. Consequently, there is a unique optimal threshold for each group. It
is
θˆ(ΠJt ) =

1 if αcp(1,Π
J
t ) ≤ αs
0 if αcp(0,Π
J
t ) ≥ αs,
the unique solution to
αcp(θ,Π
J
t ) = αs if αcp(0,Π
J
t ) < αs < αcp(1,Π
J
t ).
(3.6)
Under this task assignment rule, all workers are assigned to the simple task (a threshold of 1)
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if prior beliefs are such that a worker with a signal of 1 has higher expected productivity in
the simple task. All workers are assigned to the complex task (a threshold of 0) if prior beliefs
are such that a worker with a signal of 0 has higher expected productivity in the complex task.
Otherwise, the optimal threshold is the θ at which a worker’s expected productivity in the
complex task is equivalent to that of the simple task.
Following Moro and Norman (2003), I call a strategy profile a continuation equilibrium
if firms are implementing their optimal wage and task assignment rules given some arbitrary
investment behavior by workers. This first result suggests that wages are given by expected
marginal products and job assignments are constrained efficient in any continuation equilib-
rium.
Proposition 7. Suppose for a given period beginning at t that fractions Πt = (Π
B
t ,Π
W
t ) of
the workers invest and that (θˆt(Π
B
t ), θˆt(Π
W
t )) is as in (3.6). Then there exists a continuation
equilibrium where both firms post wage schedules
ω∆(θt,Π
J
t ) =
 ∆αs if θt < θˆ(Π
J
t )
∆αcp(θt,Π
J
t ) if θt ≥ θˆ(ΠJt ),
(3.7)
and assign a worker with characteristics (J, θt) to the complex task if and only if θt ≥ θˆt(Πt).
Moreover, in any continuation equilibrium where fractions Πt = (Π
B
t ,Π
W
t ) of the workers invest
the posted wage schedule for group J , ω∆(θt,Π
J
t ), agrees with (3.7) for almost all θt ∈ [0, 1]
for each firm.
Proof. See Appendix A
In a full equilibrium, investments must be best responses to wages. The optimal investment
decision for a worker is to invest in human capital if and only if the lifetime gain in expected
earnings is higher than the cost c. It is helpful to define what I refer to as the unit period gain
from investment. This is a worker’s one period expected gain from investment if periods have
a length of one. For wages consistent with the continuation equilibrium, where a fraction ΠJt
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of the J population is qualified, the unit period gain from investment is written as
γ(ΠJt ) =
1
∆
(∫ 1
0
ω∆(θ,Π
J)fq(θ)dθ −
∫ 1
0
ω∆(θ,Π
J)fu(θ)dθ
)
= αs[Fq(θˆ(Π
J
t ))− Fu(θˆ(ΠJt ))] + αc
∫ 1
θˆ(ΠJt )
p(θ,ΠJt )[fq(θ)− fu(θ)]dθ. (3.8)
I can also define the per period gain from investment as ∆γ(ΠJt ).
It is useful to briefly discuss the potential values of the gain from investment function.
From (3.6), I can show that there exists a Π > 0 such that all workers are assigned to the
simple task if ΠJt ≤ Π. There is also some Π¯ < 1 such that all workers are assigned to the
complex task if ΠJ ≥ Π¯. I can also show that if ΠJt ≤ Π, then γ(ΠJt ) = 0. However, the gain
from investment is strictly positive in the range (Π, 1) because p(θt,Π
J) is increasing in signal.
Thus, there is wage inequality even when all workers are assigned to the complex task. Also,
γ(ΠJt ) = 0 when Π
J
t = 1. So, in general, γ(Π
J
t ) = 0 for some low range of Π
J
t values, and then
it is strictly positive until ΠJt = 1.
Using the per period gain from investment, I can define the lifetime gain from investment
from the perspective of a worker at time t in group J . It is simply the discounted sum of all
future per period gains from investment. It can be written as
ΓJt =
∞∑
g=0
(1−∆β −∆r)g∆γ(ΠJt+g∆)
= (1−∆β −∆r)ΓJt+∆ + ∆γ(ΠJt ). (3.9)
Rearranging (3.9) yields
ΓJt+∆ − ΓJt
∆
= (β + r)ΓJt+∆ − γ(ΠJt ). (3.10)
If I let ∆→ 0, then I can express how the lifetime gain from investment evolves over time with
the following differential equation:
Γ˙Jt = (β + r)Γ
J
t − γ(ΠJt ). (3.11)
51
I can also address how the investment rate of each group’s population will develop over
time. In each period, workers in the new cohort invest if their lifetime gain from investment
exceeds their cost. The proportion of new J population births that invest in the period starting
at time t is G(ΓJt ), where G(·) is the distribution of costs.
Given the Poisson death process and the assumption that the total population is constant,
the investment rate of the whole J population at time t is
ΠJt = (1−∆β)ΠJt−∆ + ∆βG(ΓJt ). (3.12)
Rearranging (3.12) yields
ΠJt −ΠJt−∆
∆
= β
(
G(ΓJt )−ΠJt−∆
)
. (3.13)
If I let ∆→ 0, then I can express how the overall investment rate of group J evolves over time
with the following differential equation:
Π˙Jt = β
(
G(ΓJt )−ΠJt
)
. (3.14)
I conclude that any equilibria of this model is characterized by a dynamic system consisting
of (3.11) and (3.14).
Proposition 8. An equilibrium of this dynamic model is fully characterized by the following
two-variable differential equations:
Γ˙Jt = (β + r)Γ
J
t − γ(ΠJt )
Π˙Jt = β
(
G(ΓJt )−ΠJt
)
. (3.15)
This proposition indicates that the difference between the investment rate of the newborn
cohort and the overall investment rate of the group J determines the speed of the firms’
beliefs about the fraction of workers in group J that are qualified. The change in lifetime gain
from investment is determined by the difference between the discounted lifetime gain from
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investment and the unit period gain from investment.
The steady states of the dynamic system can be described as all beliefs satisfying
ΠJ = G
(
γ(ΠJ)
β + r
)
. (3.16)
The existence of a solution to (3.16) is immediate since γ(ΠJt ) is composed of continuous
functions. There may be a unique solution, in which case groups are treated identically when
they are both in the steady state. For the purposes of this analysis, multiple steady states are
desirable since persistent discrimination is only possible if this is the case.
Figure 3.1 shows an example of the dynamic system with three steady states. From now
on I denote these three steady states as Σl(Γl,Πl), Σm(Γm,Πm), and Σh(Γh,Πh), referring to
the low, middle, and high steady states, respectively. The hump shaped curve is the Γ˙Jt = 0
locus. The arrows indicate that to the right of the locus, when ΓJt > γ(Π
J
t )/(β + r), Γ
J is
increasing. To the left of the locus, ΓJt is decreasing. The s-shaped curve is the Π˙
J
t = 0 locus.
The arrows indicate that above this locus, when G(ΓJt ) < Π
J
t , Π
J
t is increasing and below the
locus it is decreasing. The shape is from the assumption that G(·) is continuous and strictly
increasing.
The existence of multiple solutions is not guaranteed and depends on the shape of Γ and
G(·). The possibility of multiple solutions can be proven by construction: if I fix the parameters
fu, fq, αc and αs, then I can find an appropriate G(·) function such that (3.16) has multiple
solutions. Graphically, if I fix the Γ˙Jt = 0 locus in Figure 3.1, I can ensure multiple equilibria
simply by selecting a G(·) function that yields multiple intersections of the two loci. I can
conclude that for any fu and fq that satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio and any technology
parameters, I can find a non-trivial set of G(·) functions that ensure multiple steady states.
It is necessary to establish which of these three steady states are stable and to determine
the potential shapes of the paths leading to steady states. Understanding the behavior of
the system outside of the steady states is important both for determining if discrimination is
persistent and for analyzing the effectiveness of the policies in Section 3.5.
The following Lemma describes the conditions that are necessary for a steady state in this
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Figure 3.1: Phase diagram of the dynamic system
dynamic model to be a saddle point.
Lemma 6. A steady state (Γ¯, Π¯) is a saddle point if
γ′t
β+r <
1
G′ |(Γ¯,Π¯) holds. Otherwise, it is a
source.
Proof. The linearization of the dynamic system in Proposition 8 around a steady state (Π¯, Γ¯)
is
Γ˙ = (β + r)Γ¯− γ(Π¯) + (β + r)(Γt − Γ¯)− γ′(Π¯)(Πt − Π¯)
Π˙ = β(G(Γ¯)− Π¯)− β(Πt − Π¯) + βG′(Γ¯)(Γt − Γ¯). (3.17)
Substituting in for Γ¯ = γ(Π¯)β+r and Π¯ = G(Γ¯) gives
Γ˙ = γ′(Π¯)(Π¯−Πt) + (β + r)(Γt − Γ¯)
Π˙ = βG′(Γ¯)(Γt − Γ¯) + β(Π¯−Πt). (3.18)
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The Jacobian matrix evaluated at a steady state is
JE ≡
 β + r −γ′
βG′ −β

(Γ¯,Π¯).
(3.19)
The trace of this matrix is trJE = r and the determinant is |JE | = −β(β + r) + βγ′G′. Since
trJE is positive, every steady state is unstable. In order for a steady state to be a saddle point
the eigenvalues must be of opposite signs. The eigenvalues of this system are:
φ1, φ2 =
r ±√r2 − 4β[(γ′G′)− (β + r)]
2
(3.20)
If 4β[γ′G′ − (β + r)] < 0, the eigenvalues will be of opposite signs. This condition can be
rewritten as: γ
′
β+r <
1
G′ .
This Lemma suggests that a steady state is a saddle point when the slope of Γt is less than
that of the inverse of G(·) at the steady state. Referencing Figure 3.1, it is apparent that both
the high and low steady states are saddle points. This inequality does not hold for the middle
steady state so it is either an unstable node or an unstable focus.
The existence of two saddle points means that members of a group may rationally conjec-
ture that firms will eventually have positive beliefs about their group’s investment rate, Πh,
or have negative beliefs about their group’s investment rate, Πl. The only reasonable steady
states for a group to approach are Σh and Σl. It is possible to characterize the shape that
the paths to these saddle stable steady states will take. Depending on the parameter values
the dynamic paths will be either deterministic or spiralling. When paths are deterministic,
historical firm beliefs completely determine the final steady state of a group. On the other
hand, when paths are spiralling, there is a region of initial firm beliefs that can lead to either
of the saddle stable steady states.
The shape of these paths is relevant in both determining the initial conditions that can
lead to persistent discrimination and in determining at what point a policy can be removed
and still guarantee the elimination of discrimination.
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Lemma 7. If (r+2β)
2
β < 4γ
′G′|(Γm,Πm) holds, then equilibrium paths spiral out in the neighbor-
hood of Σm. Otherwise, paths are deterministic.
Proof. For a steady state to be a unstable node the eigenvalues must be complex conjugate.
This occurs when
r2 − 4β[(γ′G′)− (β + r)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
from Lemma 6
< 0. (3.21)
Rearranging (3.21) yields
(r + 2β)2
β
< 4γ′G′. (3.22)
Figure 3.2 depicts a case where there are three steady states and paths are spiralling.
Spiralling paths to the steady states create a range of initial firm beliefs that can lead to either
the high or the low steady state, this is indicated by the purple region. I call this range of
initial beliefs the uncertain region. It is formed by the bottom bound of the path to the high
steady state, Πˇ, and by the upper bound of the path to the low steady state, Πˆ. If initial
firm beliefs about the investment rate of a group are in this range, [Πˇ, Πˆ], then that group can
converge to either Σh(Πh,Γh) or Σl(Πl,Γl).
When initial firm beliefs are in the uncertain region, the steady state that a group converges
to is determined by the expectations of the workers in that group. If a group develops and
shares an optimistic view of the future, then they will converge to the high steady state. If
they develop a pessimistic view, they will converge to the low steady state. Consequently, I
refer to the path that leads to the high steady state as the optimistic path and the path that
leads to the low steady state as the pessimistic path.
If initial firm beliefs for a group fall outside the uncertain region, then the steady state that
the group converges to will depend entirely on history. In the case of spiralling paths, when
initial beliefs about investment rate are such that ΠJ0 ∈ (Πˆ, 1], then group J will converge to
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Figure 3.2: Spiralling paths to the steady states
the high qualification steady state with certainty. This is because the optimistic path is the
only reasonable path to take. When initial firms beliefs are such that ΠJ0 ∈ [0, Πˇ), then group
J will converge to the low qualification steady state with certainty. As discussed in Chapter
2, the high and low steady states will always lie outside of the uncertain region, which means
that there is no way for a group to move from one steady state to another.
Figure 3.3 depicts a case where there are three steady states and paths are deterministic.
In this situation there is no uncertain region, as a result initial firm beliefs are the only factor
that determine the final steady state of a group. If initial beliefs about investment rate are
such that ΠJ0 ∈ (Πm, 1], then group J will converge to the high qualification steady state with
certainty. If ΠJ0 ∈ [0,Πm), then the group will converge to the low qualification steady state
with certainty. Again, when paths are deterministic, groups are unable to move from one
steady state to another.
From now on, regardless of the shape of the paths, I refer to the range of initial firm
beliefs that lead only to the high steady state as the certain region for Σh, and I refer to the
range of initial firm beliefs that lead only to the low steady state as the certain region for
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Figure 3.3: Deterministic paths to the steady states
Σl. These certain regions make it possible for a group to get stuck permanently at either the
high or low steady state given appropriate initial firm beliefs. This suggests that once present,
discrimination will persist indefinitely without a structural change to the model. Furthermore,
if a policy is able to move firm beliefs into the certain region for Σh, then it can be removed
and the group will continue to converge to the high steady state on their own.
3.4 Simple parameterization
I now develop a simple form of the dynamic model that I use for demonstrative purposes in
later sections. In particular, I use this parameterization to complete more specific analysis of
the effectiveness of the policies in Section 3.5. Then, in Section 3.6, I use the parameterization
to examine the welfare effects of the three policies.
Firms face the same linear per period production function as in the original model. For
simplicity workers have only two possible signals: θH and θL where θH > θL. If a worker is
qualified, they receive a signal of θH with probability Pq >
1
2 and a signal of θL with probability
1 − Pq. If a worker is unqualified, they receive a signal of θL with probability Pu > 12 and
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a signal of θH with probability 1 − Pu. The cost of investment is distributed uniformly over
[c, c]. Time is discrete, so that ∆ = 1.
The equilibria of this example are characterized by the same dynamic system as in Propo-
sition 8. Given the parameterization, I can find more specific forms of the relevant functions.
The updated optimal threshold rule is
θˆ(ΠJt ) =

1 if ΠJt ≤ Π
θH if Π < Π
J
t < Π
0 if ΠJt ≥ Π,
(3.23)
where Π and Π are calculated by updating θˆ(ΠJt ) in (3.6); they are
Π =
αs(1− Pu)
αs(1− Pu) + (αc − αs)Pq and Π =
αsPu
αsPu + (αc − αs)(1− Pq) . (3.24)
The unit period gain from investment is updated to
γ(ΠJt ) =

0 if ΠJt ≤ Π
(Pq + Pu − 1)(αcP (θH ,ΠJt )− αs) if Π < ΠJt < Π
αc(Pq + Pu − 1)(P (θH ,ΠJt )− P (θL,ΠJt )) if ΠJt ≥ Π.
(3.25)
The posterior probability that a worker with signal θH is qualified is
P (θH ,Π
J
t ) =
ΠJt Pq
ΠJt Pq + (1−ΠJt )(1− Pu)
, (3.26)
and the posterior probability that a worker with signal θL is qualified is
P (θL,Π
J
t ) =
ΠJt (1− Pq)
ΠJt (1− Pq) + (1−ΠJt )Pu
. (3.27)
The two loci of the dynamic system are now ΓJt =
γ(ΠJt )
β+r , where γ(Π
J
t ) is as in (3.25), and
ΠJt = G(Γ
J
t ), where G is the uniform distribution over [c, c].
Figure 3.4 shows the phase diagram for this example under the following parameter values:
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Figure 3.4: Phase diagram for the parametric example
Pq = 2/3, Pu = 2/3, αs = 1, αc = 2, β = 0.2, r = 0.05, c = −0.1 and c = 0.9. In this simplified
version of the dynamic model it is possible for there to be one or three steady states depending
on the parameter values. From now on I focus on parameter values that generate three steady
states. Following the convention from the previous section, I denote the three steady states as
Σl(Γl,Πl), Σm(Γm,Πm), and Σh(Γh,Πh), referring to the low, middle and high steady states,
respectively. The directional arrows of the phase diagram indicate that Σh and Σl are saddle
points and Σm is an unstable source.
Figure 3.5 demonstrates the spiralling paths to the two saddle points. The steady state
beliefs for this particular parametric example are Πl = 0.1, Πm = 0.47, and Πh = 0.76. The
paths are generated by inducting backwards from the high and low steady states using equa-
tions (3.9) and (3.12). See Appendix B.1 for a discussion of how these paths were generated.
The figure indicates that there is an uncertain region (indicated by the purple region) that
results from the spiralling paths. There are also certain regions for both Σh (the pink area)
and Σl (the blue area). These certain regions will help determine how long a potential policy
needs to be in effect to guarantee the elimination of discrimination. It is also possible to select
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Figure 3.5: Spiralling paths to the steady states in the parametric example
parameter values that generate three steady states and deterministic paths. The following pa-
rameter values generate deterministic paths: Pq = 19/20, Pu = 1/2, αs = 1, αc = 2, β = 0.5,
r = 0.5, c = −0.1 and c = 0.4.
3.5 Potential Policies
The analysis of Section 3.3 suggests that, if present, statistical discrimination is persistent.
Consequently, eliminating this discrimination requires some sort of government intervention.
In this section, I consider three government policies that have the potential to eliminate existing
statistical discrimination.
As a starting point for the analysis of these policies I assume that one group is in the
high steady state and the other is in the low steady state, so that persistent discrimination
is present. From now on I refer to the group in the low steady state as the disadvantaged
group and the group in the high steady state as the advantaged group. I then determine under
what circumstances the three policies are able to move the disadvantaged group from the low
steady state to the high steady state. Specifically, I determine whether each policy allows
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the disadvantaged group to get on the path to the high steady state. I also address if the
policy needs to be in effect permanently or if there is a point at which it can be removed and
the discrimination will not return. I assume that the government commits to employing each
policy at least until it can be safely removed and still successfully eliminate the discrimination.
I begin by considering the three policies and their effectiveness in the framework of the
general dynamic model, and then I examine the impact of these policies in the simple parame-
terization. The policies that I investigate are (1) a subsidy paid by the government to the firms
for every worker in the disadvantaged group that the firm correctly assigns to the complex
task, (2) a government subsidization of investment costs for those workers in the disadvantaged
group, and (3) a government policy that forces firms to assign workers in different groups with
the same signal to the same task and pay them the same wage.
3.5.1 Hiring subsidy program
The first policy is a hiring subsidy that promotes the assignment of disadvantaged workers
to the complex task. This subsidization is applied in the following way: For each worker
in the disadvantaged group who is correctly assigned to the complex task, the government
compensates firms with a subsidy of ∆ξ.
The government cannot actually observe whether workers are correctly assigned, instead
this policy is implemented through a lump sum payment of ∆ξΠdt [1− Fq(θˆ(Πdt )] to the firms.
This is simply the value of the subsidy times the expected number of workers from the disad-
vantaged group that will be correctly assigned to the complex task. Under the subsidy, the
firms’ profit from the disadvantaged group, given an arbitrary threshold θdt , is
λd
(
(∆αc + ∆ξ)
[
Πdt
(
1− Fq(θdt )
) ]
+ ∆αs
[
ΠdtFq(θ
d
t ) + (1−Πdt )Fu(θdt )
])
. (3.28)
Since there are two firms engaged in Bertrand competition for workers and the firms have
linear production functions, all of the benefits of the subsidy program are passed on to the
workers. Workers in the advantaged group are not affected by this policy; they will remain at
Σh. For simplicity of notation, I drop the group subscripts in this section.
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Effects of the hiring subsidy in the general dynamic model
The profit function in (3.28) indicates that I can represent the hiring subsidy with a change to
the productivity of qualified workers in the disadvantaged group. Given a subsidy of ∆ξ, the
expected productivity of a disadvantaged worker with signal θt who is assigned to the complex
task is ∆(ξ + αc)p(θt,Πt). The higher productivity of qualified workers in the disadvantaged
group means that, given the same firm beliefs, the optimal threshold is reduced by the policy.
The optimal threshold for the disadvantage group given a subsidy of ∆ξ is
θˆξ(Πt) =

1 if (αc + ξ)p(1,Πt) ≤ αs
0 if (αc + ξ)p(0,Πt) ≥ αs,
the unique solution to
(αc + ξ)p(θ,Πt) = αs if (αc + ξ)p(0,Πt) < αs < (αc + ξ)p(1,Πt).
(3.29)
Since workers are paid their expected productivity, the wages of those workers assigned to the
complex task will be higher as a result of the policy. The continuation wage under the hiring
subsidy is
ωξ∆(θ; Πt) =
 ∆αs if θ < θˆ
ξ(Πt)
∆(αc + ξ)p(θ,Πt) if θ ≥ θˆξ(Πt).
(3.30)
The gain from investment will also be impacted. The new unit period gain from investment is
γξ(Πt) = αs
[
Fq(θˆ
ξ(Πt))− Fu(θˆξ(Πt))
]
+ (αc + ξ)
[∫ 1
θˆξ(Πt)
p(θ,Πt)[fq(θ)− fu(θ)]dθ
]
. (3.31)
The change from γ(Πt) to γ
ξ(Πt) also changes the lifetime gain from investment Γt.
Consequently, under the hiring subsidy, the equilibrium for the disadvantaged group is
described by a new dynamic system.
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Proposition 9. An equilibrium of the dynamic model under a hiring subsidy is fully charac-
terized by the following two variable differential equations:
Γ˙t = (β + r)Γt − γξ(Πt)
Π˙t = β (G(Γt)−Πt) . (3.32)
It is clear that the hiring subsidy policy only impacts the Γ˙t = 0 locus. The Π˙t = 0 locus is
unchanged.
In order for this policy to eliminate discrimination it must move the disadvantaged group
into the certain region of Σh from the base model. This result is guaranteed if the dynamic
system under the hiring subsidy has only one steady state that is within the relevant region.
Given that the baseline dynamic system has three steady states, the only way that the
dynamic system under the hiring subsidy will have one steady state is if γξ(Πt) is either much
larger or much smaller than γ(Πt) for every value of Πt. If γ
ξ(Πt) is smaller, then there is
only one steady state at a low investment level. If γξ(Πt) is larger, then the single steady state
occurs at a high investment level.
The following Lemma indicates that γξ(Πt) is non-decreasing in ξ (the unit period subsidy).
This means that under the hiring subsidy policy, γξ(Πt) is larger than γ(Πt) when ξ is positive.
Lemma 8. If Πt is such that θˆ
ξ(Πt) ∈ [0, 1), then the unit period gain from investment is
strictly increasing in ξ. If Πt is such that θˆ
ξ(Πt) = 1, then the unit period gain from investment
is equal to zero and unaffected by an increase in ξ.
Proof. The partial derivative of the unit period gain from investment with respect to the hiring
subsidy ξ is
∂γξ(Πt)
∂ξ
=
∂θˆξ(Πt)
∂ξ︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
[
αs − (ξ + αc)p(θˆξ(Πt),Πt)
] (
fq(θˆ
ξ(Πt))− fu(θˆξ(Πt))
)
+
∫ 1
θˆξ(Πt)
p(θ,Πt)[fq(θ)− fu(θ)]dθ︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 unless Πt=0 or Πt=1
. (3.33)
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If Πt = 0 or 1, then γ
ξ(Πt) = 0 and consequently
∂γξ(Πt)
∂ξ = 0. There are three additional
ranges of Πt that need to be considered:
1. If Πt is such that θˆ
ξ(Πt) ∈ (0, 1), then αs − (ξ + αc)p(θˆξ(Πt),Πt) = 0 so that ∂γ
ξ(Πt)
∂ξ =∫ 1
θˆξ(Πt)
p(θ,Πt)[fq(θ)− fu(θ)]dθ > 0.
2. If Πt is such that θˆ
ξ(Πt) = 0, then γ
ξ(Πt) = (αc + ξ)
∫ 1
0 p(θ,Πt)[fq(θ) − fu(θ)]dθ and
∂γξ(Πt)
∂ξ =
∫ 1
0 p(θ,Πt)[fq(θ)− fu(θ)]dθ > 0.
3. If Πt is such that θˆ
ξ(Πt) = 1, then γ
ξ(Πt) = 0 and consequently
∂θˆξ(Πt)
∂ξ = 0.
Corollary 2. If Πsup ≡ sup
{
Π|θˆξ(Π) = 1
}
, then Πsup is decreasing in ξ.
Proof. In order for θˆξ(Πt) = 1, it must be that (αc + ξ)p(1,Πt) ≤ αs (see (3.29)). As ξ
increases, the highest Πt for which this inequality holds decreases.
Lemma 8 and the associated Corollary indicate that the unit period gain from investment
is strictly increasing in ξ unless Πt is such that θˆ
ξ(Πt) = 1, and that the range of Πt values
that induces θˆξ(Πt) = 1 is decreasing in ξ. I conclude that, as ξ increases, the Γ˙ = 0 locus
is stretched to the right and if there is a region of Πt values for which γ
ξ(Πt) = 0, its upper
bound decreases as ξ increases. At some value of ξ, which I refer to as ξmin, only one steady
state will remain and it will be at a relatively high investment rate. I refer to this steady state
as Σξ(Γξ,Πξ).
Lemma 9. If G(0) > 0, then there exists a ξmin such that for all ξ > ξmin the dynamic system
under the hiring subsidy has only one steady state, which is a saddle point.
Proof. Lemma 8 indicates that γξ(ΠJt ) is strictly increasing in ξ. This result, along with the
assumption that G(0) > 0, implies that there exists a ξmin such that for all ξ > ξmin there is
only one steady state.
Figure 3.6 depicts a potential phase diagram for the dynamic system when the hiring
subsidy is such that there is only one steady state. This steady state is a saddle point as
∂γξ
∂Π (
1
β+r ) < (
dG
dΓ )
−1|(Γ¯,Π¯) holds (See Lemma 6). Consequently, when a hiring subsidy of suffi-
cient size is put in place, the disadvantaged group will move from the low steady state to the
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Figure 3.6: Phase diagram of the dynamic system under the hiring subsidy
path that leads to Σξ(Γξ,Πξ), the only remaining steady state. In each period that the policy
is in place, the group will move along the path that approaches the steady state.
If the hiring subsidy is removed when the investment rate of the disadvantaged group is
in the certain region for Σl, then the group will return to their initial steady state. If, on the
other hand, the policy is removed after the disadvantaged group reaches the certain region for
Σh, then they will converge to Σh and discrimination will be eliminated.
It is important that Σξ is not in the uncertain region, or else there is no way to guarantee
the success of the hiring subsidy. The following lemma indicates that for a positive subsidy
Σξ is always in the certain region of Σh.
Lemma 10. If G(0) > 0 and ξ > ξmin, then Σξ will be in the certain region for Σh.
Proof. From Lemma 8, γξ(ΠJt ) is strictly increasing in ξ. By assumption, G(·) is strictly in-
creasing in its argument. Together these imply that Σξ will always involve a higher investment
rate than Σh. From Lemma 4 in Chapter 2, the upper bound of the uncertain region is always
below Πh. As a result, Σ
ξ must be in the certain region of Σh because Π
ξ is greater than Πh,
which is always in the certain region.
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Figure 3.7: Path to Σξ
Taking Lemma 10 into account, it is clear that the hiring subsidy policy will be successful
as long as a large enough subsidy is offered.
Proposition 10. If G(0) > 0 and ξ > ξmin, then the hiring subsidy will eliminate discrimi-
nation in the general dynamic model.
Corollary 3. This hiring subsidy can be removed as soon as Πt is in the certain region for
Σh.
Figure 3.7 depicts the path to the remaining steady state from the disadvantaged group’s
starting point at the low steady state, see Appendix B.2.2 for a discussion on how these paths
were generated. For comparison the figure also includes the original γ(ΠJt ) function. I do not
show the path to Σh once the policy is removed, but as long as the policy is removed after
Πt > Πˆ then the disadvantaged group will simply move to the path that leads to Σh as it is
the only plausible path given the current investment rate of the group.
I conclude that the hiring subsidy will always effectively eliminate discrimination as long
as a large enough subsidy is offered. This policy eliminates discrimination by changing the
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optimal behavior of the firms. Specifically, the subsidy makes hiring disadvantaged workers
more attractive, and this is passed on to workers with an increase in the gain from investment.
The end result is that the workers in the disadvantaged group are able to move to the high
steady state.
Effects of the hiring subsidy in the parameterization
I now apply the hiring subsidy to the parameterization described in Section 3.4. By doing
so I am able to confirm that the hiring subsidy is effective at eliminating discrimination. In
the framework of the parameterization, I am also able to determine the actual path that is
taken once the policy is put in place and to calculate the minimum ξ required to eliminate the
discrimination.
The equilibria of this simple model are described by the same dynamic system as in Propo-
sition 9. Just as in Section 3.4 I can find more specific forms of the relevant functions. The
policy only impacts the gain from investment function. It is updated to
γξ(Πt) =

0 if Πt ≤ Πξ
(Pq + Pu − 1) [(αc + ξ)P (θH ,Πt)− αs] if Πξ < Πt < Πξ
(Pq + Pu − 1)(αc + ξ) [P (θH ,Πt)− P (θL,Πt)] if Πt ≥ Πξ,
(3.34)
where Πξ and Π
ξ
are calculated by updating θˆ(Πξt ) in (3.29). They are
Πξ =
αs(1− Pu)
αs(1− Pu) + (αc + ξ − αs)Pq and Π
ξ
=
αsPu
αsPu + (αc + ξ − αs)(1− Pq) (3.35)
Compared to γ(Πt), this new gain from investment is larger for all beliefs above Π
ξ. In
the region of firm beliefs below Πξ, it is the same and equal to zero. As noted in the previous
section, the range of Πt values that leads to γ
ξ(Πt) = 0 is decreasing in ξ. This clearly holds
in this parameterization as well since Πξ is decreasing in ξ.
The phase diagram of the dynamic system under the hiring subsidy will therefore have a
new Γ˙ = 0 locus of Γt =
γξ(Πt)
β+r . This locus is larger than that of the original model for all
values of Πt > Π
ξ. The Π˙ = 0 locus is unchanged. Figure 3.8 depicts the phase diagram of the
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Figure 3.8: Phase diagram for the parametric example under the hiring subsidy
new dynamic system given that ξ = 6. All other parameter values are as in Section 3.4. The
result of this hiring subsidy is a dynamic system with only one steady state, which I refer to
as Σξ(Γξ,Πξ). The arrows indicate that Σξ is a saddle point.
In this parameterization, I am able to explicitly determine the minimum subsidy necessary
for the dynamic system have only one steady state, ξmin. The subsidy value must be such
that Πξ < G(0). In this simple model ξmin = αs
[
1−Pu
Pq
1−G(0)
G(0) + 1
]
− αc. Note that ξmin is
decreasing in the precision of signals (Pu and Pq) as well as in αc; it is increasing in αs.
Lemma 11. If G(0) > 0 and ξ > ξmin, then the simple parameterization under a hiring
subsidy has only one steady state, which is a saddle point.
Proof. This is directly proven by the directional arrows and the definition of ξmin.
The existence of a single steady state means that workers in the disadvantaged group have
only one rational path to take. As soon as the policy takes effect, workers in the disadvantaged
group move to the saddle path leading to Σξ. Figure 3.9 demonstrates this path as well as the
group’s starting point.
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Figure 3.9: Path to the Σξ in the parametric example
Figure 3.10: Path to Σh once the hiring subsidy policy is lifted
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From the analysis in Section 3.4, I know that Σξ is in the certain region for Σh (see Figure
3.2 for clarification). Consequently, the hiring subsidy is guaranteed to eliminate discrimination
as long as ξ is large enough and it can be removed as soon as firm beliefs about the investment
rate of the disadvantaged group exceed Πˆ. Once removed, the workers will converge to Σh on
their own. Figure 3.10 demonstrates the path the group will take to Σh assuming that the
policy is removed after the group reaches Σξ, see Appendix B.2.2 for a discussion on how these
paths were generated.
Proposition 11. If G(0) > 0 and ξ > ξmin, then the hiring subsidy will eliminate discrimi-
nation in the parametric example.
Corollary 4. The hiring subsidy can be removed as soon as Πt is in the certain region for Σh.
For this simple version of the model the hiring subsidy is effective at eliminating the
discrimination as long as the subsidy is large enough and the policy is left in place for long
enough. These results confirm those of the general dynamic model.
3.5.2 Investment voucher program
The second policy of interest approaches the elimination of discrimination more directly.
Rather than providing hiring incentives to the firms, an investment voucher program is de-
signed to affect the decisions of the workers. The voucher is applied in the following way: The
government provides all workers in the disadvantaged group with an investment voucher of υ
dollars. This voucher is only good towards the purchase of human capital, so it defrays the
monetary cost of investment, cm. Consequently, a voucher larger than cm has no more impact
than one equal to cm. By implementing the voucher in this way, the government does not need
to observe whether an individual worker invested or not. This policy is applied only to the
disadvantaged group, so for simplicity of notation I drop the group subscripts in this section.
Effects of the investment voucher program in the general model
I can represent this investment voucher with a change in the effective lifetime gain from
investment since the voucher is only used if a worker invests. The impact of the policy on
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the dynamic system is a strict increase in the investment rate of new workers at time t. In
particular, the proportion of investors is G(Γt + min{υ, cm}) under the voucher, rather than
G(Γt), as in the baseline model.
Consequently, under the investment voucher the equilibrium for the disadvantaged group
will be described by a new dynamic system.
Proposition 12. An equilibrium of the dynamic model under an investment voucher is fully
characterized by the following two variable differential equations:
Γ˙t = (β + r) Γt − γ (Πt)
Π˙t = β (G (Γt + min{υ, cm})−Πt) . (3.36)
The only resulting change to the phase diagram will be in the Π˙t = 0 locus, which is updated
to Πt = G(Γt + min{υ, cm}). Given that G(·) is strictly increasing, a negative voucher shifts
the Π˙t = 0 locus to the right, so that the investment rate is lower at every Γt. A positive
voucher shifts the locus to the left, so that investment rate is higher at every Γt.
Just as in the analysis of the hiring subsidy, in order for this policy to eliminate discrimina-
tion it must move the disadvantaged group to the certain region of Σh. The original dynamic
model assumes a G(·) function that generates three steady states. The investment voucher
policy does not change γ or G(·) but instead affects how investment decisions are made by
increasing the lifetime gain from investment by min{υ, cm}. The dynamic system under the
investment voucher will have only one steady state if min{υ, cm} is sufficiently positive or
negative.
Given the goal of moving the disadvantaged group to Σh, an effective investment voucher
must be positive. Moreover, assuming that the monetary cost of investment, cm, is high
enough, at some value of υ, which I refer to as υmin, only one steady state will remain. I refer
to this steady state as Συ(Γυ,Πυ). If the monetary cost of investment is low, then it is possible
that even the largest effective voucher, υ = cm, is not able to eliminate the two lower steady
states. In this case, the voucher policy is not effective at eliminating discrimination and no
matter what υ is employed there will be three steady states.
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Figure 3.11: Phase diagram of the dynamic system under the investment voucher
Lemma 12. If the dynamic system under the largest effective investment voucher, υ = cm,
has a single steady state, then there exists a υmin such that for all υ > υmin the dynamic
system under the investment voucher has only one steady state, which is a saddle point.
Proof. G(Γt + min{υ, cm}) is strictly increasing in υ when υ < cm. As υ increases, the Π˙t = 0
locus shifts to the left. Given a large enough cm, there must exist a υ
min such that for all
υ > υmin there is one steady state.
Figure 3.11 depicts a potential phase diagram for the dynamic system when the investment
voucher is large enough to induce a single steady state. According to Lemma 6, this steady
state is a saddle point as ∂γ∂Π(
1
β+r ) < (
dG
dΓ )
−1|(Γ¯,Π¯) holds. Just as in the case of the hiring
subsidy, the existence of a single steady state means that when the policy is put in place the
disadvantaged group moves from the low steady state to the path that leads to Συ(Γυ,Πυ).
In each period the policy is in effect, the group moves along the path approaching that steady
state.
In order to successfully eliminate the discrimination, the policy can only be removed when
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the disadvantaged group is in the certain region for Σh. Again it is important that Σ
υ is not
in the uncertain region, or else there is no way to guarantee the success of the investment
voucher. The following lemma indicates that for any voucher greater than υmin, Συ will be in
the certain region of Σh.
Lemma 13. If υ > υmin, then Συ will be in the certain region for Σh.
Proof. G(Γt + min{υ, cm}) is strictly increasing in υ when υ < cm. So, the Π˙t = 0 locus is
always higher under the policy. This implies that Συ will involve a higher investment rate than
Σh. From Lemma 4 in Chapter 2, the upper bound of the uncertain region is always below
Πh. Σ
υ must be in the certain region of Σh because Π
υ is greater than Πh, which is always in
the certain region.
Taking Lemma 13 into account, it is clear that the investment voucher policy will be
successful as long as monetary costs make up a large enough proportion of total costs and a
sufficient voucher is offered.
Proposition 13. If there exists a υmin, then for all υ > υmin, the investment voucher will
eliminate discrimination in the general dynamic model.
Corollary 5. This investment voucher policy can be removed as soon as Πt is in the certain
region for Σh.
Figure 3.12 depicts the path to the remaining steady state from the disadvantaged group’s
starting point at Σl, see Appendix B.2.3 for a discussion on how these paths were generated.
For comparison, the figure also includes the original Π˙ = 0 locus. As long as the policy is
removed after Πt > Πˆ, the disadvantaged group will simply move to the path that leads to
Σh as it is the only plausible path given the firms’ current beliefs about the group’s overall
investment rate.
The investment voucher approaches the discrimination issue in a different manner than the
hiring subsidy. It works by changing the incentives of the workers and making it easier for a
worker’s gain from investment to exceed his total cost. By adjusting the optimal behavior of
workers, this policy allows the firms and workers to move to the high steady state.
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Figure 3.12: Path to Συ
Effects of the investment voucher program in the simple model
I can also apply the investment voucher to the parameterization described in Section 3.4.
Examining the investment voucher policy in this simple framework allows me to explicitly
calculate the minimum required voucher and to examine how the parameters affect this value.
I am also able to see the actual path that the disadvantaged workers take to the steady state
after the policy is put in place.
The equilibria of this model are described by the same dynamic system as in Proposition 6.
The relevant functions are just as in Section 3.4. The only change resulting from the policy is
that the Π˙ = 0 locus is updated to Πt = G(Γ
J
t + min{υ, cm}). In this simple parameterization,
G(·) is uniform so the policy shifts the Π˙ = 0 locus to the left by the value of the voucher.
Figure 3.13 depicts the updated phase diagram given that υ = 0.3 and cm = 0.5. All other
parameter values are as in Section 3.4. The result is a dynamic system with only one steady
state. As with the hiring subsidy, this single steady state is not the Σh from the parametric
example.
In this simple framework, I can explicitly calculate the minimum υ necessary to produce
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Figure 3.13: Phase diagram for the parametric example under the investment voucher
only one steady state, assuming that cm is large enough. In particular G(min{υ, cm}), the
equilibrium value of Πt when Γt = 0, must be larger than Π. Put more concisely, υ must
be such that G(υ) > αs(1−Pu)αs(1−Pu)+(αc−αs)Pq . Some rearranging yields υ
min = (c − c)Π + c. This
minimum voucher is decreasing in the precision of signals (Pu and Pq) as well as in αc, and it
is increasing in αs. Note that if υ
min > cm then the policy will not be effective.
Lemma 14. If υmin = (c − c)Π + c < cm, then for all υ > υmin the dynamic system under
the investment voucher has only one steady state, which is a saddle point.
Proof. This is directly proven by the directional arrows in Figure 3.13 and the definition of
υmin.
Figure 3.14 demonstrates the path that the disadvantaged group will take to the new steady
state from their starting point at the low steady state. Following the introduction of the policy
the disadvantaged group immediately moves to the path leading to the remaining steady state
as this is the only rational action that can be taken by the workers facing this investment
voucher policy.
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Figure 3.14: Path to the Συ for the parametric example
Figure 3.15: Path to Σh once the investment voucher policy is lifted
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Referring back to Figure 3.5, it is clear that Συ is in the certain region for Σh because
Πυ > Πh. In this parameterization, as long as υ
min < cm, any voucher that exceeds the
minimum required value is guaranteed to eliminate discrimination. The investment voucher
must be in effect until the investment rate of the disadvantaged group is in the certain region
of Σh. As soon as this occurs the policy can be removed and the disadvantaged group simply
moves to the path to Σh. Figure 3.15 depicts the path that will be taken if the policy is
removed after the group reaches Συ.
Proposition 14. If υmin < cm, then for all υ > υ
min the investment voucher will eliminate
discrimination in the parametric example.
Corollary 6. The investment voucher policy can be removed as soon as Πt is in the certain
region for Σh.
I can conclude that this policy will eliminate discrimination in the parametric example as
long as the monetary cost of investment is large enough and a sufficient investment voucher is
provided. These results confirm those for the general dynamic model.
3.5.3 Government enforced equal treatment
The final policy of interest involves intervention by the governing body with respect to the
optimal behavior of the firms. Specifically, under what I call the equal treatment policy, the
government requires that both firms ignore a workers’ group identity when assigning tasks and
wages. This policy affects both disadvantaged and advantaged workers.
The equal treatment policy can be formally stated as: Firms are forbidden to condition
task and wage assignments on group identity. I assume that the government is able to observe
the firms’ task and wage assignments and if they observe a deviation from the policy, they will
charge the firm a substantial fine. As long as this fine is large enough, the firms will never
have incentive to deviate.
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Effects of the equal treatment policy in the general model
Under the equal treatment policy, the firms’ optimal behavior can no longer depend on group
identity. So there will be a single θˆ(Πt) and a single ω∆(θt; Πt) in each period, rather than one
for each group.
The updated optimal threshold at time t is the one which maximizes a firm’s output
conditional on investment decisions. Formally, the task assignment problem is
max
θt∈[0,1]
∆αc
[
(λdΠdt + λ
aΠat )(1− Fq(θt))
]
+∆αs
[
(λdΠdt + λ
aΠat )Fq(θt) + (1− (λdΠdt + λaΠat ))Fu(θt)
]
. (3.37)
Just as in the original dynamic model there is a unique solution to the task assignment problem.
But, in this case, it is not solved separately for each group. If I define a firm’s beliefs about
the entire population of workers as Πpop = λdΠdt + λ
aΠat , then the unique optimal threshold is
θˆ(Πpopt ) =

1 if αcp(1,Π
pop
t ) ≤ αs
0 if αcp(0,Π
pop
t ) ≥ αs,
the unique solution to
αcp(θ,Π
pop
t ) = αs if αcp(0,Π
pop
t ) < αs < αcp(1,Π
pop
t ).
(3.38)
The continuation wage under the equal treatment policy will also depend on Πpop rather than
the group investment rates. The new optimal wage schedule for both firms is
ω∆(θt; Π
pop
t ) =
 ∆αs if θt < θˆ(Π
pop
t )
∆αcp(θt,Π
pop
t ) if θt ≥ θˆ(Πpopt ).
(3.39)
This change in the task assignment rule and the associated alteration of the continuation
wage results in a new unit period gain from investment (and per period gain from investment).
The updated unit period gain from investment is
γ(Πpopt ) = αs
[
Fq(θˆ(Π
pop
t ))− Fu(θˆ(Πpopt ))
]
+ αc
∫ 1
θˆ(Πpopt )
p(θ,Πpopt )[fq(θ)− fu(θ)]dθ. (3.40)
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Under the policy, the lifetime gain from investment for each group will be determined by the
population investment rate rather than the group investment rate. This causes a subsequent
change in the dynamic system.
Proposition 15. An equilibrium of the dynamic model under the equal treatment policy is
fully characterized by the following differential equations:
Γ˙popt = (β + r)Γ
pop
t − γpopt (Πpopt )
Π˙popt = β (G(Γ
pop
t )−Πpopt ) . (3.41)
The dynamic system in (3.41) is identical to that of the original dynamic model. The
only difference is that it describes the entire population rather than each individual group. In
order to talk about when the equal treatment policy can be removed, it is also necessary to
determine how a firm’s beliefs about the investment rate of each group will change over time.
Under the policy these beliefs are described by: Π˙Jt = β
(
G(Γpopt )−ΠJt
)
.
Since I have already assumed that the original dynamic model has three steady states,
with the high and the low steady states being saddle points, I know that the dynamic system
under the equal treatment policy will as well. I call these three steady states Σpopl (Γ
pop
l ,Π
pop
l ),
Σpopm (Γ
pop
m ,Π
pop
m ), and Σ
pop
h (Γ
pop
h ,Π
pop
h ) referring to the low, middle and high steady states.
Lemma 15. Under the equal treatment policy the dynamic system of the general model has
three steady states. Σpopl and Σ
pop
h are saddle points and Σ
pop
m is a source.
The uncertain region, if present, is identical to that of the original dynamic model. With
that in mind, it is straightforward to determine in which cases this policy will be effective.
Given that the starting point of this analysis is one in which discrimination is present, when
the policy is put in place the investment rate of the population is: Πpop0 = λ
aΠh+λ
dΠl. If this
Πpop0 is in the certain region for Σh, then the policy will be effective as the entire population
will move to the only feasible path, which happens to lead to the high steady state. However
if Πpop0 is in the uncertain region of firm beliefs, then the policy will only be effective if the
entire population of workers is optimistic. The policy is guaranteed to fail if Πpop0 is in the
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certain region for Σl.
Proposition 16. If Πpop is in the certain region for Σh or if Π
pop is in the uncertain region
and the population is optimistic, then the equal treatment policy will eliminate discrimination
in the general dynamic model.
Corollary 7. This equal treatment policy can be removed as soon as Πat and Π
d
t are both in
the certain region for Σh.
Corollary 7 indicates that while the equilibria of the model are described by the system
in (3.41) the movement of the individual group’s investment rates is still an important factor
in determining when the policy can be removed. This will be more clear when I examine the
effects of the equal treatment policy on the simple parameterization.
I can restate the results of Proposition 16 in terms of the size of the disadvantaged popu-
lation. Specifically, if λd < Πh−ΠˆΠh−Πl , then the equal treatment policy is guaranteed to eliminate
discrimination in the general dynamic model. I conclude that this policy is more likely to be
effective if the disadvantaged population is small or if the difference between Πl and Πh is
small.
This policy is different from the previous two because it impacts workers in both the
advantaged and the disadvantaged groups. It is attractive to consider this policy because
there is no direct cost associated with it. However, the policy is potentially disastrous if the
initial population investment rate is in the certain region for Σl, or in the uncertain region and
the population is pessimistic.
Effects of the equal treatment policy in the parameterization
I now apply this equal treatment policy to the parameterization of Section 3.4. As I determined
in the previous subsection, this policy generates the same dynamic system as the original model;
however, there is only one dynamic system that depends on the population investment rate,
rather than two separate systems each depending on the group investment rate.
In the simply dynamic model under the equal treatment policy the optimal threshold rule
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for both groups will be
θˆt(Π
pop
t ) =

1 if Πpopt ≤ Π
θH if Π < Π
pop
t < Π
0 if Πpopt ≥ Π,
(3.42)
where Π and Π are just as in the original parametric example. They are
Π =
αs(1− Pu)
αs(1− Pu) + (αc − αs)Pq and Π =
αsPu
αsPu + (αc − αs)(1− Pq) . (3.43)
Given the optimal task assignment rule in (3.42), the unit period gain from investment is
γ(Πpopt ) =

0 if Πpopt ≤ Π
(Pq + Pu − 1)(αcP (θH ,Πpopt )− αs) if Π < Πpopt < Π
αc(Pq + Pu − 1)(P (θH ,Πpopt )− P (θL,Πpopt )) if Πpopt ≥ Π.
(3.44)
The two loci of the dynamic system under the equal treatment policy are Γpopt =
γ(Πpopt )
β+r ,
where γ(Πpopt ) is as in (3.44), and Π
pop
t = G(Γ
pop
t ), where G(·) is the uniform distribution over
[c, c].
I can draw the same conclusions for the simple parameterization under the equal treatment
policy as I did for the general dynamic model. If the original parameterization has three steady
states, so will the parameterization under the equal treatment policy. Similarly, if Πpop0 is in
the certain region for Σh, then the policy will definitely eliminate discrimination. On the other
hand, if Πpop0 is in the uncertain region, then discrimination will be eliminated only if the
population is optimistic. The following Proposition formalizes these results.
Proposition 17. If Πpop is in the certain region for Σh or if Π
pop is in the uncertain region
and the population is optimistic, then the equal treatment policy will eliminate discrimination
in the parametric example.
Corollary 8. This equal treatment policy can be removed as soon as Πat and Π
d
t are both in
the certain region for Σh.
Figure 3.16 shows the paths to the steady states for the same parameter values as in Section
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Figure 3.16: Potential starting points under the equal treatment policy
3.4. I make the additional assumption that λa = 0.75 and λd = 0.25. From the analysis in
Section 3.4 I know that the steady state beliefs in this example are Πl = 0.1, Πm = 0.47,
and Πh = 0.76. So the resulting initial beliefs about the proportion of the population that is
qualified are Πpop0 = 0.60; this starting point is indicated in the figure by the purple dotted line.
For this parameterization, the uncertain region of initial firm beliefs is Πt ∈ [0.32, 0.65]. It is
clear that Πpop0 is in this region. As such, the policy may or may not be effective depending on
whether the population is optimistic or pessimistic. The purple dots in Figure 3.16 indicate
the three points that the population may move to after the policy is put in place. Note that
there are two points on the pessimistic path and one on the optimistic path.
Figure 3.17 shows the path that the population will take if it is optimistic. I also include
the paths that the two groups will take from their individual starting points, see Appendix
B.2.4 for a discussion of how these paths were generated. The disadvantaged group starts with
an investment rate of Πl because that is the steady state that they were previously operating
in. The advantaged group starts with an investment rate of Πh for the same reason. It is clear,
from the figure, that when the policy is put in place, each group moves to the their individual
83
Figure 3.17: Path to Σh given an optimistic population
Figure 3.18: Path to Σl given a pessimistic population
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path to the high steady state. Figure 3.18 shows one of the paths that the population may
take if it is pessimistic.
When the policy is removed, the two groups are again treated separately. For this reason,
the policy can only be removed, and still be successful, if both groups have an investment rate
that is in the certain region for Σh. Once the policy is removed, each group will simply move
to the path leading to the high steady state, as this is the only feasible path. Note that there
is no real reason to remove this policy because it has no cost, and the high steady state under
the policy is the same as the high steady state without the policy.
Just as in the general dynamic model under the equal treatment policy, if the proportion
of the population that is in the disadvantaged group is very small, then the policy will be
successful at eliminating the discrimination. For this particular set of parameter values if
λd < 0.17, then the policy is guaranteed to eliminate the discrimination.
3.6 Welfare analysis of the three policies in a parametric example
I am now able to look at the welfare effects of the three policies for the specific parameter-
ization of the dynamic model described in Section 3.4. I complete this analysis in a general
equilibrium framework. The hiring subsidy and investment voucher policies require that the
government have funds to distribute to the firms and to the workers in the disadvantaged
group, respectively. Given the general equilibrium framework, these funds are collected by the
government via a tax levied on workers in the advantaged group.
For the purpose of more meaningful comparison between the three policies, I apply the
minimum necessary voucher and minimum necessary subsidies. For the parametric example
υmin = 7/30 and ξmin = 7/2. I also assume that the population is optimistic so as to guarantee
that the equal treatment policy is successful. The government also commits to employing each
policy until the impacted groups reach their new steady state.
Table 3.1 describes the conditions of the advantaged and disadvantaged groups before a
policy is applied. Notice that the advantaged group has a higher average per period expected
welfare than the disadvantaged group does. See Appendix B.2.1 for a discussion of how these
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Table 3.1: Details of the discriminatory equilibrium
Pu = Pq = 2/3, λ
a = 3/4, c ∼ U [−0.1, 0.9] Discriminatory Equilibrium
αs = 1, αc = 2, β = 0.2, r = 0.05 Disadvantaged group (d) Advantaged group(a)
Steady state investment Πd = 0.1000 Πa = 0.7631
Lifetime gain from investment Γd(Πd) = 0 Γa(Πa) = 0.663
Wages ω(θH ,Π
d) = 1 ω(θH ,Π
a) = 1.7313
ω(θL,Π
d) = 1 ω(θL,Π
a) = 1.2340
Average per period expected welfare 1.0010 1.4833
values were calculated.
Figures 3.19, 3.20 and 3.21 depict the average expected welfare of each group and of the
population as a whole under the subsidy, voucher and equal treatment policies, respectively.
Each figure shows the welfare before the policy is in place, how welfare changes when the
policy is applied and then when the policy is removed. All three policies move those in the
disadvantaged group to the high steady state, so the end result of each policy is that the
welfare across groups is equal and the discrimination is eliminated. See Appendices B.2.2,
B.2.3 and B.2.4 for a discussion of how these values were calculated.
Comparing across figures indicates that the hiring subsidy is the most costly of the three
policies. The reason for this is two-fold. First, the transfer that is necessary to fund the policy
is very large. Second, the hiring subsidy is provided for each worker correctly employed in the
complex task in every period the policy is in place. The result is that the advantaged group
loses a significant amount of welfare over the course of the policy. However, this policy will
get the disadvantaged group to the steady state in the shortest amount of time.
The voucher policy is the least costly of the three policies. This is because the transfer
necessary to support the policy is very low and in each period it is only paid to new workers
that choose to invest. This policy needs to be in place for slightly longer than the hiring
subsidy policy. The equal treatment policy also has a relatively small negative impact on
the advantaged group, but it has the additional benefit of not requiring the government to
redistribute income across groups. However, the equal treatment policy must be in place for
the longest amount of time. Note that, across all policies, the welfare loss to the advantaged
group would be greater if the disadvantaged group was larger.
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Figure 3.19: Welfare effects of the hiring subsidy
Figure 3.20: Welfare effects of the investment voucher
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Figure 3.21: Welfare effects of the equal treatment policy
Table 3.2 shows the total change in welfare for each group and the population while each
policy is in place. These numbers are simply the sum of the welfare gains of the disadvantaged
group and the sum of the welfare losses of the advantaged group for each period that the policy
is in place. The net welfare effect is the weighted sum of these two values, taking into account
the relative sizes of the two groups. This table indicates that, while the subsidy does increase
the disadvantaged group’s welfare greatly, the net result over the course of the policy is the
least favorable. The most favorable, in terms of net change in welfare is the equal treatment
policy and the voucher policy falls somewhere in the middle.
Depending on a policy makers preferences, it may be that the investment voucher, equal
treatment policy or hiring subsidy is preferred. If the policy maker wants to inconvenience the
advantaged group the least, then the investment voucher is best. If his goal is to ensure that
net welfare is improved the most, then the equal treatment policy is best. If the policy maker
wants the policy in place for the shortest amount of time then the hiring subsidy is preferred.
Keep in mind that both the investment voucher and equal treatment policies can fail to be
successful for some parameterizations. In particular, if the monetary cost of investment is low,
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Table 3.2: Total change in welfare while the policies are in effect
Group d welfare gain Group a welfare loss Net change in pop. welfare
Hiring Subsidy 61.908 17.855 2.086
Investment Voucher 12.251 0.329 2.816
Equal Treatment 18.495 0.887 3.959
then it may be that there is no voucher that can eliminate the low steady state. Similarly, if
the population is pessimistic, then the equal treatment policy will have the disastrous effect
of moving both groups to the low steady state. The subsidy policy, on the other hand, will
always have the intended effect given that a large enough subsidy is applied.
3.7 Conclusion
The main contribution of this paper is to analyze the effectiveness of several government
policies designed to eliminate discrimination in a dynamic environment. Unlike policy analysis
in a static environment, I am able to determine the paths that each group will take once a
policy is put in place and to address how long a policy needs to be in effect. The base model
allows for competitive wages, and as a result I am also able to perform meaningful welfare
analysis of the three policies in a general equilibrium setting.
I find that the hiring subsidy policy will always effectively eliminate discrimination but it
results in a significant loss in welfare to the advantaged group while in place. However, this
policy does have the advantage of needing to be in effect for the shortest amount of time. I also
find that the investment voucher is a successful policy as long as a large enough proportion of
the investment costs are monetary in nature. This policy may be attractive to policy makers
because it involves very little loss in welfare to the advantaged group.
The equal treatment policy may or may not be successful depending on several conditions.
The policy is safe to implement in industries where a majority of the workers are in the
advantaged group or if the population as a whole is optimistic. If this is the case, then it may
be the preferred policy, as it requires no transfers from advantaged to disadvantaged workers
and welfare losses are relatively small. However, the equal treatment policy should not be
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applied if a large proportion of workers are disadvantaged or if the population as a whole is
pessimistic.
I also determine that all three of these policies need only be in effect until the investment
rates of both groups are in the certain region of the high steady state. Once this occurs the
policies can be safely removed and the groups will converge to the high steady state on their
own.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1
The following proof is a slightly modified version of one found in Moro and Norman (2003,
2002). I make only slight adjustments to suit my purposes, as such all credit should be given
to them. Due to the linear nature of the firms’ production function, I will address each group
separately. For simplicity in notation I drop all group indicators J .
Proof. (Sufficiency). Given pi ∈ (0, 1], let θ(pi) be the unique solution to the task assign-
ment problem, τ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] be the threshold rule with cut-off θ(pi) and (C(pi), S(pi)) =
(piFq(θ), piFq(θ) + (1− pi)Fu(θ)) be the associated aggregate factor inputs. Suppose that each
firm posts the wage schedule ω : [0, 1] → < given by ω(θ;pi) in (2.7). Moreover, suppose that
workers facing indifference between working for firm 1 and firm 2 based on wage and task
assignments (in equilibrium this will be all workers) simply flip a fair coin. This implies that
C1(pi) = C2(pi) =
C(pi)
2
S1(pi) = S2(pi) =
S(pi)
2
. (A.1)
The profit for firm 1 is (firm 2 is equivalent)
Π1 = αsS1(pi) + αcC1(pi)− 1
2
∫ 1
0
ω(θ;pi)[pifq(θ) + (1− pi)fu(θ)]dθ
= αsS1(pi) + αcC1(pi)− 1
2
∫ θ(pi)
0
αs[pifq(θ) + (1− pi)fu(θ)]dθ
− 1
2
∫ 1
θ(pi)
αc
pifq(θ)
pifq(θ) + (1− pi)fu(θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
p(θ,piJ )
[pifq(θ) + (1− pi)fu(θ)]dθ
(A.2)
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Π1 = αsS1(pi) + αcC1(pi)− 1
2
[αs
∫ θ(pi)
0
[pifq(θ) + (1− pi)fu(θ)]dθ + αc
∫ 1
θ(pi)
pifq(θ)dθ]
= αsS1(pi) + αcC1(pi)− 1
2
[αsS(pi) + αcC(pi)] = 0. (A.3)
Suppose one firm deviates to (ω′, τ ′) 6= (ω, τ). Let C ′ and S′ denote the implied factor inputs
and let a(θ) ∈ [0, 1] denote the fraction of workers with signal θ that accepts a job at the
deviating firm. Since ω′(θ;pi) ≥ ω(θ;pi) for all θ such that a(θ) > 0 the profit for the deviating
firm, Π′i, satisfies
Π′i ≤ αsS′ + αcC ′ −
∫ 1
0
ω(θ;pi)a(θ)[pifq(θ) + (1− pi)fu(θ)]dθ, (A.4)
where (here the assumption that ties are broken the same way by qualified and unqualified
workers is used)
C ′ =
∫
τ ′(θ)pifq(θ)a(θ)dθ and S′ =
∫
(1− τ ′(θ))a(θ)[pifq(θ) + (1− pi)fu(θ)]dθ. (A.5)
Moreover ω(θ;pi) = max {αcp(θ, pi), αs} so,
∫
ω(θ;pi)a(θ)[pifq(θ) + (1− pi)fu(θ)]dθ
=
∫
τ ′(θ)ω(θ;pi)a(θ)[pifq(θ) + (1− pi)fu(θ)]dθ
+
∫
(1− τ ′(θ))ω(θ;pi)a(θ)[pifq(θ) + (1− pi)fu(θ)]dθ
≥ αs
∫
(1− τ ′(θ))a(θ)[pifq(θ) + (1− pi)fu(θ)]dθ + αc
∫
τ ′(θ)pifq(θ)a(θ)dθ
= αsS
′ + αcC ′. (A.6)
This implies that Π′i ≤ αsS′ + αcC ′ − [αsS′ + αcC ′] = 0.
To prove necessity of the conditions in Proposition 1 I proceed by proving a sequence of
intermediate results:
Lemma 16. Each firm earns zero profit in equilibrium.
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Proof. Let Π1 and Π2 denote the profits for firm 1 and firm 2 and assume for contradiction
that Π1 > 0. If Π2 < 0 there would be a profitable deviation, so I assume without loss that
0 ≤ Π2 ≤ Π1. Total industry profits are
Π1 + Π2 = αsS1 + αcC1 + αsS2 + αcC2
−
∫
θ
max {ω1(θ), ω2(θ)} [pifq(θ) + (1− pi)fu(θ)]dθ. (A.7)
I observe that αsS1+αcC1+αsS2+αcC2 ≤ αsS(pi)+αcC(pi). This simply means that aggregate
output cannot exceed what a planner could achieve. Suppose firm 2 deviates by offering ω′2
given by ω′2(θ) = max{ω1(θ), ω2(θ)} +  for some  > 0, implying that firm 2 attracts all
workers. In addition suppose firm 2 assigns as in the solution to (2.2). The corresponding
profit is
Π′2 = αsS(pi) + αcC(pi)−
∫
θ
max {ω1(θ), ω2(θ)} [pifq(θ) + (1− pi)fu(θ)]dθ − 
= αsS(pi) + αcC(pi)− [αsS1 + αcC1 + αsS2 + αcC2] + Π1 + Π2 − 
≥ Π1 + Π2 − . (A.8)
Hence for  sufficiently small Π′2 > Π2 is a profitable deviation. Thus proving the statement
by contradiction.
Lemma 17. ω1(θ) = ω2(θ) for almost all θ ∈ [0, 1] in any equilibrium.
Proof. For contradiction, suppose that ω1(θ) > ω2(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ′ ⊂ [0, 1] and let
β =
∫
θ∈Θ′
(ω1(θ)− ω2(θ))[pifq(θ) + (1− pi)fu(θ)]dθ, (A.9)
where Θ′ has a positive measure, which implies that β > 0. Let C1, C2, S1, S2 be the effective
factor inputs in the hypothetical equilibrium and suppose that firm 1 deviates and offers ω′1
given by ω′1(θ) = ω2(θ) +  for all θ and assigns all workers (the deviation attracts all workers)
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in accordance with (2.2), the solution to the task assignment problem. The implies profits are
Π′1() = αsS(pi) + αcC(pi)−
∫
θ
ω2(θ)[pifq(θ) + (1− pi)fu(θ)]dθ − 
= αsS(pi) + αcC(pi)−
∫
θ∈Θ′
ω1(θ)[pifq(θ) + (1− pi)fu(θ)]dθ + β
−
∫
θ∈[0,1]\Θ′
ω2(θ)[pifq(θ) + (1− pi)fu(θ)]dθ − 
≥ αsS1 + αcC1 + αsS2 + αcC2 −
∫
θ
max {ω1(θ), ω2(θ)} [pifq(θ) + (1− pi)fu(θ)]dθ + β − 
= β − , (A.10)
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 16. The deviation is thus profitable if  is small
enough, thus the equilibrium where ω1(θ) > ω2(θ) cannot be optimal.
Lemma 18. αsS1 + αcC1 + αsS2 + αcC2 = αsS(pi) + αcC(pi).
Proof. By feasibility αsS1+αcC1+αsS2+αcC2 ≤ αsS(pi)+αcC(pi), so assume for contradiction
that αsS(pi) + αcC(pi)− αsS1 − αcC1 − αsS2 − αcC2 = β > 0. Suppose firm 1 offers ω′1(θ) =
ω2(θ) +  for all θ and assigns all workers(the deviation attracts all workers) in accordance
with (2.2), the solution to the task assignment problem. The implied profits are
Π′1() = αsS(pi) + αcC(pi)−
∫
θ
ω2(θ)[pifq(θ) + (1− pi)fu(θ)]dθ − 
> αsS1 + αcC1 + αsS2 + αcC2 −
∫
θ
ω2(θ)[pifq(θ) + (1− pi)fu(θ)]dθ − . (A.11)
But (Lemma 17) ω1(θ) = ω2(θ) almost everywhere so
∫
θ ω2(θ)[pifq(θ) + (1− pi)fu(θ)]dθ is the
sum of wages paid out by firms 1 and 2 before the deviation. By zero profits (Lemma 16) this
implies that Π′() = β − , so for  small enough the deviation is profitable.
Lemma 19. Suppose (ω1, ω2) is a pair of equilibrium wage schedules and let θ(pi) be as in (3).
Then there is a pair (ks, kc) such that (1) ωi(θ) = ks for i = 1, 2 and for almost all θ < θ(pi),
(2) ωi(θ) = p(θ, pi)kc for i = 1, 2 and for almost all θ ≥ θ(pi).
Proof. The two parts have almost identical proofs, I will prove only part (2), which may
appear as less obvious. Let ω(θ) = max{ω1(θ), ω2(θ)} and (C(pi), S(pi)) be the factor inputs
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corresponding to (2.2) the unique solution to the task assignment problem. For contradiction
suppose there is a set A ⊂ [θ(pi), 1], where m = ∫A pifq(θ)dθ > 0, and for some β > 0 such that
for all θ ∈ A,
ω(θ)
p(θ, pi)
≤ 1
1− Fq(θ(pi))
∫ 1
θ(pi)
ω(θ)
p(θ, pi)
fq(θ)dθ − β
=
1
pi(1− Fq(θ(pi)))
∫ 1
θ(pi)
ω(θ)[pifq(θ) + (1− pi)fu(θ)]dθ − β
1
C(pi)
∫ 1
θ(pi)
ω(θ)[pifq(θ) + (1− pi)fu(θ)]dθ − β. (A.12)
By continuity there exists a set B ∈ [0, θ(pi)) such that ∫B[pifq(θ) + (1 − pi)fu(θ)]dθ = S(pi)C(pi)m
and
ω(θ) ≤ 1
piFq(θ) + (1− pi)Fu(θ)
∫ 1
θ(pi)
ω(θ)[pifq(θ) + (1− pi)fu(θ)]dθ
=
1
S(pi)
∫ θ(pi)
0
ω(θ)[pifq(θ) + (1− pi)fu(θ)]dθ (A.13)
for every θ ∈ B. Consider a deviation by firm i where it offers ω′i(θ) = ω(θ) +  to workers
with θ ∈ A ∪B and ω′i(θ) = 0 for all other θ, and assigns workers from A to the complex task
and workers from B to the simple task. The profit from this deviation is
Π′ = αc
∫
A
pifq(θ)dθ + αs
∫
B
[pifq(θ) + (1− pi)fu(θ)]dθ
−
∫
θ∈A∪B
(ω(θ) + )[pifq(θ) + (1− pi)fu(θ)]dθ
≥ [αcC(pi) + αsS(pi)] m
C(pi)
−
(
1
C(pi)
∫ 1
θ(pi)
ω(θ)[pifq(θ) + (1− pi)fu(θ)]dθ − β
)∫
θ∈A
p(θ, pi)[pifq(θ) + (1− pi)fu(θ)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=pifq(θ)
dθ
−
∫
θ∈B
[pifq(θ) + (1− pi)fu(θ)]dθ
[
1
S(pi)
∫ θ(pi)
0
ω(θ)[pifq(θ) + (1− pi)fu(θ)]
]
− 
∫
θ∈A∪B
[pifq(θ) + (1− pi)fu(θ)]dθ
(A.14)
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= [αcC(pi) + αsS(pi)]
m
C(pi)
−
(∫ 1
θ(pi)
ω(θ)[pifq(θ) + (1− pi)fu(θ)]dθ − β
)
m
C(pi)
− S(pi)
C(pi)
m
[
1
S(pi)
∫ θ(pi)
0
ω(θ)[pifq(θ) + (1− pi)fu(θ)]dθ
]
− 
∫
θ∈A∪B
[pifq(θ) + (1− pi)fu(θ)]dθ
=
m
C(pi)
(
αcC(pi) + αsS(pi)−
∫
θ∈[0,1]
ω(θ)[pifq(θ) + (1− pi)fu(θ)]dθ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 by Lemmas 16 and 17
+ β
m
C(pi)
− 
∫
θ∈A∪B
[pifq(θ) + (1− pi)fu(θ)]dθ. (A.15)
Hence, Π′ ≥ β mC(pi) − 
∫
θ∈A∪B[pifq(θ) + (1− pi)fu(θ)]dθ > 0 for  small enough, which together
with Lemma 17 establishes part (2) of the claim. The proof for the other half is symmetric.
It’s simply a matter of Removing β from (A.12) and inserting a β in the inequality in (A.13)
and again constructing an A and B such that the factor ratio is as in the unique threshold in
(2.2). The rest of the argument is unaltered.
Proof. (Necessity). It remains to be shown that ks = αs and kc = P (θ, pi)αc Firms would make
positive profits if ks < αs and kc < P (θ, pi)αc and negative profits if the inequalities go the
other way. Thus I must only consider cases where the inequalities are of opposing directions.
The arguments are symmetric so I only consider the case with ks > αs and kc < P (θ, pi)αc. If
θ(pi) = 0, (1) each firm makes positive profits (loss), so the only case to consider is when θ(pi)
is interior. A necessary condition for optimality for problem (2.2) is that αcP (θ(pi), pi) = αs.
Hence there must be an interval (θ(pi), θ∗) where ωi(θ) = p(θ, pi)kc < ks for all θ ∈ (θ(pi), θ∗).
Consider the deviation
ω′i(θ) =
 ω(θ) for θ ∈ (θ(pi), θ
∗)
0 otherwise
and τ ′i(θ) =
 0 for θ ∈ (θ(pi), θ
′)
1 for θ ∈ (θ′, θ∗),
(A.16)
where θ′ is set so that the factor ratio is as in the solutions to (2.2),
( ∫ θ∗
θ′ pifq(θ)dθ∫ θ′
θ(pi)[pifq(θ)+(1−pi)fu(θ)]dθ
= C(pi)S(pi)
)
.
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The profit is
Π′ = αc
∫ θ∗
θ′
pifq(θ)dθ + αs
∫ θ′
θ(pi)
[pifq(θ) + (1− pi)fu(θ)]dθ
−
∫ θ′
θ(pi)
ω(θ)[pifq(θ) + (1− pi)fu(θ)]dθ −
∫ θ∗
θ′
ω(θ)[pifq(θ) + (1− pi)fu(θ)]dθ
>
(αcC(pi) + αsS(pi))
∫ θ∗
θ′ pifq(θ)dθ
C(θ)
− αc
∫ θ′
θ(pi)
[pifq(θ) + (1− pi)fu(θ)]dθ − αs
∫ θ∗
θ′
pifq(θ)dθ
=
1
C(pi)
∫ θ∗
θ′
pifq(θ)dθ[αcC(pi) + αsS(pi)− αsS(pi)− αcC(pi)] = 0. (A.17)
which completes the proof of Proposition 1.
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Appendix B
Mathematical Methods
B.1 Calculating paths to the steady states
Calculating the paths to the steady states is relatively straightforward. First, it is necessary
to determine all the steady state values by finding the solutions to the following system of
equations:
Π∗ = G (Γ∗) (B.1)
Γ∗ =
γ(Π∗)
β + r
. (B.2)
Once Σh(Πh,Γh), Σm(Πm,Γm), and Σl(Πl,Γl) are known, I can determine the path to the
high steady state by evaluating
ΠJt−1 =
ΠJt − βG
(
ΓJt
)
1− β and (B.3)
ΓJt−1 = (1− β − r)ΓJt + γ(ΠJt−1) (B.4)
at ΠT = Πh−  and ΓT = Γh− . This process yields ΠT−1 and ΓT−1, which can then be used
to find ΠT−2 and ΓT−2. I repeat this process until the middle steady state is reached. The
result is a series, {Γt,Πt}Tt=n, that maps out the path from the middle steady state to the high
steady state.
I can determine the path to the low steady state by evaluating equations (B.3) and (B.4)
at ΠT = Πl +  and ΓT = Γl + . This process yields ΠT−1 and ΓT−1, which can then be used
to find ΠT−2 and ΓT−2. I repeat this process until the middle steady state is reached. The
result is a series, {Γt,Πt}Tt=n, that maps out the path from the middle steady state to the low
steady state.
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For the parameterization described in Section 3.4 the steady states are the solutions to the
following system of equations:
Π∗ = Γ∗ + 0.10 (B.5)
Γ∗ = 4γ(Π∗), (B.6)
where
γ(ΠJt ) =

0 if ΠJt ≤ 1/3
1
3(
3ΠJt −1
ΠJt +1
) if 1/3 < ΠJt < 2/3
2
3(
2ΠJt
ΠJt +1
− ΠJt
2−ΠJt
) if ΠJt ≥ 2/3.
(B.7)
Solving this yields the following three steady states: Σh(Γh = 0.6631,Πh = 0.7631),Σm(Γm =
0.3687,Πm = 0.4687) and Σl(Γl = 0.0,Πl = 0.1000)
In order to generate the optimistic path pictured in Figure 3.5, I induct backwards from
ΠT = Πh − 0.0001 and ΓT = Γh − 0.0001 using the following equations:
ΠJt−1 = 1.25Π
J
t − 0.25ΓJt − 0.025 (B.8)
ΓJt−1 = .75Γ
J
t + γ(Π
J
t−1). (B.9)
The resulting series {Γt,Πt}Tt=n describes the optimistic path. Similarly, I generate the pes-
simistic path by inducting backwards from ΠT = Πl + 0.0001 and ΓT = Γl + 0.0001. The
resulting series, {Γt,Πt}Tt=n, describes the pessimistic path.
B.2 Welfare calculations
B.2.1 Welfare in the base model
In order to understand the welfare effects of the three policies, it is necessary to determine
the average expected welfare in both the high and low steady states of the base model for
the parameterization described in Section 3.4. The general equation for the average expected
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welfare in one period is
W (ΠJt ) = Π
J
t︸︷︷︸
Proportion of
qualified workers
[∫ 1
0
ω∆(θ,Π
J
t )fq(θ)dθ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected wage
of qualified workers
− β︸︷︷︸
fraction of
new births
∫ Γ(ΠJt )c cg(c)dc
G(Γ(ΠJt ))

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected cost
given investment
]
+ (1−ΠJt )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Proportion of
unqualified worker
∫ 1
0
ω∆(θ,Π
J
t )fu(θ)dθ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected wage
of unqualified workers
. (B.10)
For the parameterization discussed in Section 3.3 the average expected welfare can be
simplified to
W (ΠJt ) = Π
J
t
[
Et[ω∆|q]− β
(
Γ(ΠJt )− 0.10
2
)]
+ (1−ΠJt )Et[ω∆|u], (B.11)
where
Et[ω∆|u] =

1 if ΠJt ≤ 1/3
2
3(
3ΠJt +1
ΠJt +1
) if 1/3 < ΠJt < 2/3
2
3(
2ΠJt
2−ΠJt
+
2ΠJt
1+ΠJt
) if ΠJt ≥ 2/3
(B.12)
and
Et[ω∆|q] =

1 if ΠJt ≤ 1/3
1
3(
9ΠJt +1
ΠJt +1
) if 1/3 < ΠJt < 2/3
2
3(
ΠJt
2−ΠJt
+
4ΠJt
1+ΠJt
) if ΠJt ≥ 2/3.
(B.13)
Evaluating (B.11) at the high and low steady states provides the baseline welfare level for
workers in the advantaged and disadvantaged groups. In this case, W (Πh) = 1.4833 and
W (Πl) = 1.0010.
B.2.2 Welfare under a hiring subsidy
The first step to determining the welfare effects of the hiring subsidy policy is to calculate the
path that the disadvantaged group will take when the policy is put in place as well as the path
that they will take to the high steady state when the policy is lifted. Once these paths are
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established, I can calculate the welfare of each group for each period of interest.
I begin by determining the single steady state of the dynamic system under the policy.
This steady state is the solution to the following system of equations:
Πξ = G(Γξ) (B.14)
Γξ =
γξ(Πξ)
β + r
. (B.15)
I refer to the single steady state as Σξ(Γξ,Πξ). Once this is determined I find the disadvantaged
group’s path to the steady state by inducting backwards from ΓT = Γ
ξ −  and ΠT = Πξ − 
using the following equations:
Πdt−1 =
Πdt − βG
(
Γdt
)
1− β (B.16)
Γdt−1 = (1− β − r)Γdt + γξ(Πdt−1). (B.17)
To determine the path taken after the policy is removed I use (B.3) and (B.4) and induct
backwards from ΠT = Πh +  and ΓT = Γh + .
For the parameterization of interest the steady state is Σξ(Γξ = 0.8159,Πξ = 0.9159). This
is determined by finding the solution to the following system of equations:
Πξ = Γξ + 0.10 (B.18)
Γξ = 4γξ(Πξ), (B.19)
where
γξ(ΠJt ) =

0 if ΠJt−1 ≤ 0.10
1
3(
10ΠJt −1
ΠJt +1
) if 0.10 < ΠJt < 0.31
11
6 (
2ΠJt
ΠJt +1
− ΠJt
2−ΠJt
) if ΠJt ≥ 0.31.
(B.20)
In order to find the path that the disadvantaged group will take to this steady state, I
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induct backwards from ΓT = Γ
ξ −  and ΠT = Πξ −  using the following equations:
Πdt−1 = 1.25Π
d
t − 0.25Γdt − 0.025 (B.21)
Γdt−1 = .75Γ
d
t + γ
ξ(Πdt−1), (B.22)
where  = 0.00000001.
I use (B.8) and (B.9) and induct backwards from ΠT = Πh +  and ΓT = Γh +  to find the
path taken after the policy is removed.
To determine the welfare effects while the subsidy is in place, I look at the Γt,Πt pairs on
the path to Σξ starting from Πl, the disadvantaged group starting point, through the steady
state values under the policy. To find how welfare changes after the policy is lifted I look at
the Γt,Πt pairs starting from Π
ξ until the high steady state is reached. With these values I
am able to calculate each group’s welfare during each period that the policy is in place as well
as during the periods after it is removed.
The policy is applied in a general equilibrium framework so that the workers in the advan-
taged group are taxed in order to fund the policy. As such, the welfare of both groups will
be impacted by the policy, even though the behavior of the advantaged group is not affected.
The welfare of the advantaged group while the policy is in place is the following
W a(Πat ,Π
d
t ) = W (Πh)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Welfare in the
high steady state
− ξ︸︷︷︸
Value of the
subsidy
λd
λa︸︷︷︸
Fraction of the
subsidy that each
worker provides
Πdt︸︷︷︸
Proportion of
qualified workers
∫ 1
θˆ(Πdt )
fq(θ)dθ.︸ ︷︷ ︸
Probability a qualified
worker is assigned to C︸ ︷︷ ︸
Per worker transfer in each period
(B.23)
This is simply the average welfare in the high steady state minus the average expected
transfer. Note that the transfer each worker in the advantaged group provides depends on the
relative sizes of the two groups. Clearly, if more of the population is disadvantaged, then the
loss in welfare to those in the advantaged group is higher.
The average expected welfare of the disadvantaged group while the policy is in place is the
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following
W d(Πdt ) = Π
d
t
[∫ 1
0
ωξ∆(θ,Π
d
t )fq(θ)dθ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected wage of
qualified workers under
the subsidy policy
−β
∫ Γ(Πdt )c cg(c)dc
G(Γ(Πdt ))
]
+ (1−Πdt )
∫ 1
0
ωξ∆(θ,Π
d
t )fu(θ)dθ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected wage of
unqualified workers under
the subsidy policy
. (B.24)
The only way that this differs from (B.10) is that it depends on the expected wage under the
subsidy policy, ωξ∆(θ,Π
d
t ); all other components are the same.
For the parameterization, the advantaged group’s average expected welfare while the policy
is in place is
W a(Πat ,Π
d
t ) = 1.4833−
7Πdt
6
P [θt > θˆ(Π
d
t )|q], (B.25)
where
P [θt > θˆ(Π
d
t )|q] =

0 if Πdt ≤ 0.10
2
3 if 0.10 < Π
d
t < 0.31
1 if Πdt ≥ 0.31.
(B.26)
The average expected welfare for the disadvantaged group is
W dt (Π
d
t ) = Π
d
t
(
Et[ω
ξ
∆|q]− β
(
Γ(Πdt )− 0.10
2
))
+ (1−Πdt )Et[ωξ∆|u], (B.27)
where
Et[ω
ξ
∆|u] =

1 if Πdt ≤ 0.10
1
3(
13Πdt+2
Πdt+1
) if 0.10 < Πdt < 0.31
11
3 (
Πdt
2−Πdt
+
Πdt
1+Πdt
) if Πdt ≥ 0.31
(B.28)
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and
Et[ω
ξ
∆|q] =

1 if Πdt ≤ 0.10
1
3(
23Πdt+1
Πdt+1
) if 0.10 < Πdt < 0.31
11
6 (
Πdt
1−Πdt
+
4Πdt
1+Πdt
) if Πdt ≥ 0.31.
(B.29)
To generate Figure 3.19 I evaluate (B.25) and (B.27) at all Γt,Πt pairs along the path
starting from Πl = 0.10 till the group is within 0.0001 of the single steady state of the dynamic
system under the hiring subsidy. To calculate the welfare after the policy is removed I evaluate
(B.11) at all Γt,Πt pairs along the path from Π
ξ till the group is within 0.0001 of the high
steady state.
B.2.3 Welfare under an investment voucher
In order to find the welfare effects of the investment voucher policy, I must determine the
path that the disadvantaged group will take once the policy is put in place as well as the path
that they will take to the high steady state once the policy is lifted. Once these paths are
established, I can calculate the welfare of each group for each period that the policy is in place.
The first step to calculating the path that the disadvantaged group will take once the
investment voucher policy is implemented is to determine the single steady state of the dynamic
system under the policy. This steady state is the solution to the following system of equations:
Πυ = G(Γυ + υ) (B.30)
Γυ =
γ(Πυ)
β + r
. (B.31)
I refer to it as Συ(Γυ,Πυ). Once this is determined, I can find the disadvantaged group’s path
to the steady state by inducting backwards from ΓT = Γ
υ −  and ΠT = Πυ −  using the
following equations:
Πdt−1 =
Πdt − βG
(
Γdt + υ
)
1− β (B.32)
Γdt−1 = (1− β − r)Γdt + γ(Πdt−1). (B.33)
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I then use (B.3) and (B.4) and induct backwards from ΠT = Πh +  and ΓT = Γh +  to find
the path taken after the policy is removed.
For the simple parameterization, the steady state is Συ(Γυ = 0.5058,Πυ = 0.8391). This
is determined by finding the solution to the following system of equations:
Πυ = Γυ +
1
3
(B.34)
Γυ = 4γ(Πυ), (B.35)
where γ(·) is as in (B.7).
In order to find the path that the disadvantaged group will take to this steady state, I
induct backwards from ΓT = Γ
υ −  and ΠT = Πυ −  using the following equations:
Πdt−1 = 1.25Π
d
t − 0.25Γdt − 0.0833 (B.36)
ΓJt−1 = .75Γ
d
t + γ(Π
d
t−1), (B.37)
where  = 0.00000001.
To determine the path taken after the policy is removed I use (B.8) and (B.9) and induct
backwards from ΠT = Πh +  and ΓT = Γh + .
I can calculate the welfare effects while the voucher is in place by looking at all the Γt,Πt
pairs along the path to Συ starting from Πl, the disadvantaged group starting point. To find
how welfare changes after the policy is lifted, I look at all the Γt,Πt pairs along the path to Σh
starting from the Πυ. With these values, I can to calculate each group’s welfare during each
period that the policy is in place as well as during the periods after it is removed.
The policy is applied in a general equilibrium framework so that the workers in the advan-
taged group are taxed in order to fund the policy, as such the welfare of both groups will be
impacted by the policy, even though the behavior of the advantaged group is not affected.
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The welfare of the advantaged group while the policy is in place is
W a(Πat ,Π
d
t ) = W (Πh)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Welfare in the
high steady state
− υ︸︷︷︸
Value of the
voucher
λd
λa︸︷︷︸
Fraction of the
voucher that each
worker provides
β︸︷︷︸
Fraction of
new births
G(Γ(Πdt ) + υ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Proportion of
workers that invest
under the voucher︸ ︷︷ ︸
Per worker transfer in each period
. (B.38)
Note that the transfer that each worker in the advantaged group provides depends on the
relative sizes of the two groups. Clearly if more of the population is disadvantaged, then the
loss in welfare to those in the advantaged group is higher.
The welfare of the disadvantaged group while the policy is in place is
W d(Πdt ) = Π
d
t
[∫ 1
0
ω∆(θ,Π
d
t )fq(θ)dθ − β
( ∫ Γ(Πdt )+υ
c cg(c)dc
G(Γ(Πdt ) + υ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected cost given
investment under the
voucher policy
− υ︸︷︷︸
Value of
the voucher
)]
+ (1−Πdt )
∫ 1
0
ω∆(θ,Π
d
t )fu(θ)dθ. (B.39)
The only way that this differs from (B.10) is that workers are more likely to invest (as a result
of the voucher) and the costs associated with this investment are reduced by υ.
For the parameterization, the average expected welfare for the advantaged group while the
policy is in place is
W a(Πat ,Π
d
t ) = 1.4833− 0.0156
(
Γ(Πdt ) + 0.1333
)
. (B.40)
The average expected welfare for the disadvantaged group while the policy is in place is
W d(Πdt ) = Π
J
t
(
Et[ω∆|q]− β
(
Γ(ΠJt )− 0.20
2
))
+ (1−ΠJt )Et[ω∆|u], (B.41)
where Et[ω∆|u] and Et[ω∆|q] are as in (B.12) and (B.13), respectively.
To generate Figure 3.20, I evaluate (B.40) and (B.41) at all Γt,Πt pairs along the path to
Συ starting from Πl, the disadvantaged groups starting point, till they are within 0.0001 of
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Συ. To calculate the welfare after the policy is removed I evaluate (B.11) at all Γt,Πt pairs
along the path to Σh starting from Π
υ till they are within 0.0001 of the high steady state.
B.2.4 Welfare under the equal treatment policy
Finding the welfare effects of the equal treatment policy is slightly more involved than the
process for the previous policies. Two steps are necessary. First, I must find the path that
the entire population takes to the high steady state once the policy is put in place. Using this
path I can then find the individual paths of the two groups. It is important to consider the
fact that the population as a whole will reach the steady state before the two groups do, as
such I must account for several periods where the population investment rate is not changing
but the group investment rates still are. Once the two groups reach the steady state, then the
policy can be safely removed.
The dynamic system is the same under the equal treatment policy as it is without the
policy, but it depends on the firms beliefs about the average investment rate of the entire
population. As such the first step is to calculate the path that the population as a whole will
take once the policy is put in place. I assume that the population is optimistic so that they
will take the path to the high steady state. I determine the population’s path to the high
steady state by inducting backwards from ΓpopT = Γh−  and ΠpopT = Πh−  using the following
equations:
Πpopt−1 =
Πpopt − βG (Γpopt )
1− β (B.42)
Γpopt−1 = (1− β − r)Γpopt + γ(Πpopt−1). (B.43)
After this process I have all the Γpopt , Π
pop
t pairs that form the path to the high steady
state. I am only interested in the path starting at Πpop = λaΠh + λ
dΠl. Once I calculate the
population path, I can find the paths that the individual groups will take by forward inducting
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from Πd0 = Πl and Π
a
0 = Πh using the following equations:
Πdt = (1− β)Πdt−1 + βG (Γpopt ) (B.44)
Πat = (1− β)Πat−1 + βG (Γpopt ) . (B.45)
Note that I know the relevant Γpopt values from the previous calculation of the population’s
path the high steady state.
For the parameterization of interest the high steady state is Σh(Γh = 0.6631,Πh = 0.7631).
In order to find the path that the population will take to this steady state I induct backwards
from ΓpopT = Γh −  and ΠpopT = Πh −  where  = 0.00000001 using the following equations:
Πpopt−1 = 1.25Π
pop
t − 0.25Γpopt − 0.025 (B.46)
Γpopt−1 = .75Γ
pop
t + γ
pop(λaΠat−1 + λ
dΠdt−1). (B.47)
After this process I know all the Γpopt , Π
pop
t pairs that form the path to the high steady
state. I am only interested in the path starting at Πpop = 0.5973. With this path I am able
to determine the paths that the two groups will take by forward inducting from Πd0 = 0.1000
and Πa0 = 0.7631 using the following:
Πdt = 0.80Π
d
t−1 + 0.20Γ
pop
t + 0.02 (B.48)
Πat = 0.80Π
a
t−1 + 0.20Γ
pop
t + 0.02. (B.49)
In this parameterization it is also necessary to include ten periods where Πpop is at the steady
state level but the individual groups are still approaching it.
In order to determine the average expected welfare of the disadvantaged group while the
equal treatment policy is in place, I look at both the Γpopt ,Π
pop
t pairs that form the population
path and the Γpopt ,Π
d
t pairs that form the disadvantaged group’s path starting from Π
d = Πl
and Πpop = λaΠh + λ
dΠl until Σ
pop is reached. For the advantaged group I consider both the
Γpopt ,Π
pop
t pairs that form the population path and the Γ
pop
t ,Π
a
t pairs that form the advantaged
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group’s path starting from Πa = Πh and Π
pop = λaΠh+λ
dΠl until Σ
pop is reached. With these
values I can then calculate each group’s welfare during each period that the policy is in place.
The welfare of the each group while the policy is in place is
W J(ΠJt ,Π
pop
t ) = Π
J
t︸︷︷︸
Proportion of
qualified workers
[∫ 1
0
ω∆(θ,Π
pop
t )fq(θ)dθ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected wage
of qualified workers
− β︸︷︷︸
fraction of
new births
∫ Γ(Πpopt )c cg(c)dc
G(Γ(Πpopt ))

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected cost
given investment
]
+ (1−ΠJt )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Proportion of
unqualified worker
∫ 1
0
ω∆(θ,Π
pop
t )fu(θ)dθ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected wage
of unqualified workers
for J = a, d. (B.50)
Note that these two welfare values depend on both the population investment rate and the
relevant group investment rate.
For the parameterization the average expected welfare of each group while the policy is in
place is
W J(ΠJt ,Π
pop
t ) = Π
J
t
(
Et[ω
pop
∆ |q]− β
(
Γ(Πpopt )− 0.10
2
))
+ (1−ΠJt )Et[ωpop∆ |u], (B.51)
where Et[ω
pop
∆ |u] and Et[ωpop∆ |q] are as in (B.12) and (B.13), respectively. They are simply
evaluated at Πpop rather than ΠJ .
To generate Figure 3.21 I evaluate (B.51) at all relevant pairs along the paths from the
starting point Πpop = 0.5973,Πd = 0.1000,Πa = 0.7631 till both groups are within .0001 of
the high steady state.
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